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Summary findings
Orenstein examines the political and institutional  proposal actors, such as Poland and Hungary.  Legacies  of
processes that produced fundamental pension reform  in  policy, the development of civi'v  society, and
three postcommunist countries: Hungary,  Kazakhstan,  international organizations also profoundly  affect the
and Poland. He tests various hypotheses about the  shape and progress of reform.
relationship between deliberative process and outcomes  Orenstein sees pension reform as happening in three
through detailed case studies of pension reform.  phases: commitment-building, coalition-building, and
The outcomes of reform were similar: each country  implementation.  He presents hypotheses about tradeoffs
implemented a mandatory funded pension system as part  among inclusiveness (of process), radicalism (of reform),
of reform, but the extent and configuration of changes  and participation in, and compliance with, the new
differed greatly.  system.
Countries with more "veto actors" - social and  One hypothesis: Including more, and more various,
institutional actors with an effective veto over reform - veto and proposal actors early in the deliberative process
engaged in less radical reform, as theory predicted.  increases buy-in and compliance when reform is
Poland and Hungary generated less radical change than  implemented, but at the expense of faster and greater
Kazakhstan, partly because they have more  change.
representative political systems, to which more  Early challenges in implementation in all three
associations, interest groups, and "proposal actors" have  countries, but especially in Kazakhstan, suggest the
access. Proposal actors shape the reform agenda and  importance of improving buy-in through  inclusive
influence the positions of key veto actors. Pension  deliberative processes, where possible.
reform takes longer in countries with more veto and
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41  INTRODUCTION*
This  paper  derives and  tests  a  set  of hypotheses  about  the  influence  of  political-
inistitutional structures and  processes  on  pension reform  in  the  postcommunist  states.  In
particular, the report seeks to  understand the ways that political-institutional variables  have
shaped pension  reforms  in  Kazakhstan, Hungary and  Poland.  These  were  the  first  three
rostcommunist countries to adopt multi-pillar pension reforms including a funded, private pillar,
vvith  advice and assistance from the World Bank.  However, the size and structure of this funded
pillar, as well as numerous other aspects of its regulation, anid  the character of simultaneous
changes in other pillars of the pension system, differ greatly across the three countries.  What are
the main  differences and  why  did they  occur?  Whal impact have political  processes and
institutional structures had on the outcomes of reform? In answvering  these questions, this report
aims to draw lessons for future World Bank involvement  in national social policy processes.
The type of pension reform implemented in Kazakhstan, Hungary and Poland -- what I
wvill  call  "fundamental" (Rutkowski  1998) or  "multi-pillar" reform  --  goes  beyond making
significant changes to  the  parameters and  structure of the  pre-existing state  system.  It  is
characterized by the partial replacement of the former state system with a mandatory pension
system, in which individuals save for retirement through defined contributions to special pension
accounts. Pension funds invest these contributions on individuals' behalf and at the end of his or
tier working life, the contributions and investment returns, minius  fees, are used to purchase an
annuity that provides the individual with retirement income.  This type of system is called a
' funded" system, because pensions are backed by actually-existing money, on deposit with a
pension fund.  Such pension privatization represents a "paradigmnatic  shift" from the Bismarckian
and Beveridgean models of old-age security that have dominated in Europe for over a century
(Muller 1999).  It is part of a global trend towards creating "private markets for public goods"
(Graham 1998). Multi-pillar pension reform is, however.,  distinct from the Chilean model. Chile
adopted a pension system that relies almost entirely on a private, funded pillar, with a modest
ininimum pension guarantee. While the multi-pillar  model advocated by many at the World Bank
(1994) often includes a private funded pillar, as in Chile, it does not seek to eliminate public pay-
as-you-go systems entirely, nor does it recommend sole reliance on private, funded systems.
As  in Western  Europe and Latin  America, stat.e-run pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension
systems have predominated in postcommunist Europe since the second world war.  A PAYG
system is one in which current tax revenues finance current benefits.  Such a system is based on
am intergenerational pact in which today's workers support today's pensioners, and in turn are
promised support in their old  age by a  future generation of workers.  The state establishes,
maintains and administers this  social contract.  PAYG pension systems have served the first
generations of participants well, but now face a  number of  problems, particularly population
aging, that have called into question the future of PAYG systems in countries around the world
(World Bank 1994). In postcommunist Europe, PAYG systems also suffered a series of shocks
in the  1990s, related to  market transition.  Economic downturn caused contribution rates to
PAYG systems to drop as unemployment and "gray" market economic activity increased. At the
same time, postcommunist pension systems were often used to alleviate labor market adjustment,
by moving older workers into early retirement (Cangiano et al. 1998; Andrews and Rashid 1996).
'rhis  led to  the growth of a large implicit public pension debt that threatens to make current
systems unsustainable (James 1998a, 274).  In postcommunist countries, the system dependency
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Agnieszka Chlon (Poland), Ilean Cashu and Hilda
Eitzen (Kazakhstan) and Viktoria Danics (Hungary). The author would also like to thank Estelle James, Robert
Palacios,  Michal Rutkowski, Roberto Rocha, Emily Andrews and participants of an October 22, 1998 brown bag
lunch for their extremely useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
5ratio, the number of pension beneficiaries to the number of contributors, has risen sharply during
the transition (Cangiano et al. 1998, 10; Andrews and Rashid 1996).
Governments have attempted to adjust in a number of ways.  In some countries (Poland,
Latvia, Bulgaria, Slovakia), governments raised taxes to finance increased pension expenditures.
In  other countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Croatia), governments controlled spending by
cutting benefit  levels, in  a systematic or ad hoc manner.  Still other countries (Kazakhstan,
Romania, Russia) contained pension spending through the accumulation of sizeable payment
arrears (Cangiano et al. 1998; Andrews and Rashid 1996).
TABLE 1. PENSION  SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTS,  1990-1996
Kazakhstan  Broadly  Increasing in  Increasing as a  Declining  Declining  Declining  Broadly
constant at  early 1990s,  percentage of  since 1993  balanced,
about 4.5%,  then declining,  GDP  except for
but large  reflecting  arrears
arrears, up to  demographic
about 2% of  factors and
GDP at end-  emigration
1996
Hungary  Broadly  Rising rapidly  Sharp drop in  Dropping  Declining  Broadly  PAYG balance
constant (at  (20 percent  real terms  rapidly because  constant at  deficit
about 10%  of  during 1989-  (25% from  of base  very high  deteriorating
GDP)  95), reflecting  1990-95) due  erosion, in the  levels (35%/o),  by about 2% of
sharp increase  to less than full  presence of  declining in  GDP between
in disability  price indexafn,  high  1997  1991-95
pensions, but  and fall in real  contribution
also early  value of entry  rates
retirement  pension  _
Poland  Pension  Increased  Generous  Rising in the  Declining  Increase in the  Sharp
expenditure  rapidly as a  pension  early 1990s,  early 1990s;  deterioration in
ratio doubled  result of early  increases in the  although not as  broadly stable  the early l990s
in early 1990s,  retirement and  early 1990s,  much as  since then  with budget
to about 15%;  disability  more contained  expenditure,  subsidies rising
approximately  pensions in  real growth  broadly  to 6% of GDP
constant since  early 1990s  after 1991;  constant since  in 1992; cut to
then  decreasing  then  0.5% by 1996
since 1996  plus 2% for
farmers system
Source:  Adapted  from  Cangiano  et al. (1998,  12).
Table 1 shows that Kazakhstan, Hungary, and Poland faced very different pension system
problems in  1996.  Pension expenditure as  a  percent  of  GDP  ranged  from  under  5%  in
Kazakhstan, to 10% in Hungary, to 15% in Poland.  Much of this difference can be explained by
strategies of adaptation after 1990. In Kazakhstan, pension expenditures were controlled through
the buildup of substantial pension arrears, amounting to about 2% of GDP at the end of 1996. In
Hungary, pension expenditures were controlled at pre-transition levels by less-than-full price
indexation of benefits, while system dependency grew dramatically.  In Poland, eased eligibility
criteria for pensions and increased benefit levels in the early 1990s caused pension expenditures
to double as a percent of GDP.  It is worth noting that Poland has one of the highest levels of
pension expenditure in postcommunist Europe, despite having a relatively young demographic
profile, especially compared to Hungary.  The ratio of people aged 60 and up as a percentage of
those 20-59 years old was 29.9% in Poland, compared to 35.6% in Hungary in 1996 (Schrooten
et al. 1998, 6-7).  The only common feature of the pension crises in all these three countries was
the drop in compliance rates.  However, in their different ways, each of these countries' pension
systems experienced severe financial strains.  After trying a variety of strategies to adjust to the
new burdens placed on their pension systems, the three countries examined in this  report all
opted for fundamental reform.
6Thie  World Bank has been recommending to countries around the world that they enact
fundamental  pension  reform  in  which  "some  of  an  individual's  pension  is  financed  by
preretirement savings, which are privately managed" (James 1998a, 275).  The model advocated
in The World Bank's Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994) contains three pillars, that may be
weighted and configured in various ways:
1.  A mandatory, publicly managed, tax-financed first pillar for pension redistribution
2.  A mandatory, privately managed, fully funded second pillar for savings
3.  A voluntary third pillar for people who want more protection in their old age.
T he first pillar, in this view, should be more redistributive than most current PAYG plans, and be
geared towards achieving the Beveridgean goal of basic income support.  This can be achieved
thirough  a flat benefit (as in Argentina or the United Kingdorn), a means-tested benefit (as in
Austrialia), or a minimum pension guarantee (as in Chile). Because of their mainly redistributive
fmnction,  they can be financed, in part, from general tax revenues.  The second pillar provides a
means of pension savings, in the form of a state-mandated,  privately-managed system.  Pension
benefits in this  pillar are fully-funded.  Contributions are defined, but  the  level of benefits
depends on the outcome of investment decisions.  The World ]Bank  assumes that funded pillars
will be more sustainable than pay-as-you-go systems and comrpetitive  private management will
lead to better returns than public management.  A voluntary third pillar can be organized in a
number of ways, for instance as enterprise- or industry-based funds, mutual-benefit societies or
rrivate insurance, and offers supplemental benefits.
Countries  around the world -- mostly in Europe and Latin America -- have implemented
raulti-pillar systems.  And many postcommunist countries are considering implementing them in
the future.  Existing multi-pillar systems have been implemented both with and without World
Bank assistance, and they have differed along several dimensions. Perhaps the key dimension of
cifference is the relative size of the private and public pillars.  For example, in Latin America,
Chile phased out  its public pay-as-you-go system, Uruguay chose a  large public  pillar, and
Argentina fell somewhere in between.  But there are other important differences. One concerns
whether the employer or employee chooses where to invest the funds.  Australia, for instance,
built its  mandatory, ftmded pillar  on top  of a  voluntary system  of occupational (employer)
pensions that already covered 40 percent of the population in 1986.  Hence employers choose
where to invest (World Bank 1994, 274) (although increasingly workers are being given some
choice here). However, many other countries base their systems on individual choice among
competing pension investment funds. Another important design difference concerns whether, and
for whom, the funded system is mandatory.  In Peru, private funded and pay-as-you-go public
systems coexist, and workers can choose to participate in one or the  other.  In many other
countries, however, all or some categories of workers must participate in the ftmded system.
Finally,  some reforms  concern mainly the first pillar.  Sweden and  Italy, for instance,  both
switched to defined-contribution first pillars that remain largely pay-as-you-go (James 1998a,
278).
In  the  postcommunist  countries, similar  variation can be  observed.  Kazakhstan  is
phasing out its PAYG first pillar and replacing it with a minimum pension guarantee, while
Hlungary  or Poland both decided to maintain large, earnings-related first pillars.  However, they
are doing this in different ways.  Hungary is rationalizing its defined benefit first pillar, while
Poland chose to  introduce a "notional defined contribution" system with individual accounts
(described below).  Kazakhstan will have a  much larger private to  public  ratio than  either
Hungary or Poland, and all three countries chose different ways of organizing and regulating
iheir new private pillars.  How did policy legacies and  institutional structures influence the
(lesign of fundamental pension reforms?  What influence dicl particular interest groups have?
And how have differences in the political process in each country shaped outcomes?
7The following three sections develop a general model of the social sector reform process
and use it to derive testable hypotheses about the role of policy legacies, political-institutional
factors and international influence in fundamental pension reform.  These hypotheses are tested
through comparative case studies of the policy process in Kazakhstan, Hungary and Poland in
section five.  Section six derives comparisons and some general lessons about the impact of the
major actors in postcommunist pension reform.  Section seven presents policy recommendations
based on the case study findings.
2  THE POLICY  PROCESS  FOR SOCIAL  SECTOR  REFORMS
2.1  POLICY  LEGACIES
In Bringing the State Back In, a path-breaking 1985 book that heralded the rise of a "new
institutionalism" in the social sciences, Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol presented a model of
social sector policy change. Elaborated to explain the different ways in which states embraced or
did not embrace Keynesian policies in the 1930s, the model showed how state structures and
policy legacies shaped the adoption of economic reforms.
FIGURE  1. A MODEL  OF  INSTITUTIONAL  INFLUENCES  ON  THE  POLICY  PROCESS
Policy-relevant
intellectual innovations
State  /  _
structures  Activities of politicians  ,  Government policies
and policy  and officials
legacies
Politically expressed
demands of social groups
Source:  Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesianism':
Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States," in Bringina  the State Back
In, eds., Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985, 119.
While previous models had emphasized the demands of social groups or new ideas (intellectual
innovations) as being at the root  of the switch to Keynesian policies in the 1930s, Weir and
Skocpol demonstrated that these factors by themselves could not explain important variations in
the ways that Britain, Sweden, and the United States implemented Keynesian policies.  Their
analysis showed that the content of radical policy change is heavily influenced by previous state
structures and  policy  legacies.  Weir  and  Skocpol  found  that  pre-existing  policy  biases,
institutions and programs determined the specific forms that Keynesianism took in each country.
8The finding that institutional structures and policy legacies have a strong impact on the
direction of change will not  surprise anyone with experience of social sector reform in  the
postcommunist countries.  Studies have shown that institutional legacies of the  communist
welfare state regime are the most important factors influencing social policy during the post-
1989 transition (Ringold 1999), including high social spend.ing.  Policy legacies of the early
transition period are also crucial (Cain and Surdej 1999).  Decisions and non-decisions taken
during this time constrain the choices of policymakers considering fundamental reform.
Weir and Skocpol showed that governnment  social policies are the outcome of a complex,
path-dependent process whereby politicians, usually situated in  positions determined by the
institutional configuration of the old system, respond to ideas generated or interpreted through
the mechanisms of the old system, and respond to social groups whose interests and expectations
are also influenced by,  and expressed through the old  system.  Given the heavy weight of
existing state structures and policy legacies, even the nmost  rELdical  reforms tend to run through
the channels cut by previous state policy.
This model suggests the hypothesis that policy legacies influence the design of social
sector reforms.  One of the key policy legacies in the area of pension reform is the size of the
pension system, and particularly the size of the implicit pension debt (IPD), "the present value of
the  pension  promises  that  are  owed  to  current  pensioners  and  workers  because  of  their
participation in the old system" (James 1998b, 459). Based on previous research (James 1998b),
we would expect countries with  high  implicit pension debt, and  therefore a  higher cost  of
financing the transition to a private, funded system, to choose a lower private share and a larger
public pillar.  As James writes, "The larger the implicit pensiion  debt (IPD)....  the greater the
likelihood that this method will be  used.  Most countries that ended up with  a large, hence
earnings-related, public pillar had a high IPD in the old system " (James 1998b).  We would also
expect other aspects of pension reform to reflect continuities with previous policy designs and
institutions. Thus hypothesis 1 predicts:
H1: Policy legacies influence  present reform choices. In particular,
*  Countries with higher implicit  pension debt will choose a smaller private pillar and
retain a larger PA  YG public pillar, in other words, less radical reform.
*  Other pension reform design elements will build upon the legacies of pre-existing
pension institutions.
Although  Weir and Skocpol's model offers a  useful. way to  analyze the influence of
political institutional variables on economic reforms in a domestic context, it also leaves some
important elements out.  In particular, the recent spread of pension reforms internationally raises
the need to include the mediating role of political institutions and the influence of international
organizations in the model.  Figure 2 presents a modified mnodel  of the social policy process,
building upon the Weir and Skoepol's emphasis on policy legacies.  These changes are discussed
in the following sections on mediating political instititions and the influence of international
actors.
9FIGURE  2. MODIFIED  MODEL  OF  THE  SOCIAL  POLICY  PROCESS
Policy discourse in  Policy interventions by
international organizations <  international organizations
Policy-relevant
intellectual innovations
State  /  _  _i/
structures  Activities of politicians  Ol Government policies
and policy  and officials
legacies  \  Mediated by
..............  ...............................................  political  institutions
Politically expressed
demands of social groups
2.2  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY ACTORS
Political institutions have a great deal of influence in determining which actors are most
influential in a given policy area.  They not only define who the relevant policymakers are, but
also strongly shape opportunities for effective interest group mobilization.  Different institutions
structure the policy process and mediate relations among policy actors in different ways.  They
render policy-makers more or less insulated from some interest groups and parties, and more or
less responsive to some others.  But which political institutions are the most important in shaping
and mediating the policy process?  Political institutions can be divided into numerous categories,
including authoritarian versus democratic systems, presidential versus parliamentary systems,
majoritarian versus  consensus democracies, etc.  One  recent  effort to  move  beyond  these
overlapping dichotomies suggests that systematic effects of political institutions on policy can
best be  studied by  looking at the number of "veto players"  or  "veto actors"  involved  in  a
particular policy area under particular institutional arrangements (Tsebelis 1995). The approach
taken  here builds  on  Tsebelis'  framework for  understanding how  institutions  structure  the
possibilities of policy change.
Veto actors.  According to Tsebelis, veto players can be divided into three groups: institutional
veto players, who have a constitutional right to  exercise veto power over legislation; partisan
veto players, who have the effective power to veto legislation by virtue of their position as part of
a majority in parliament or a governing coalition; and other veto actors, who may vary by policy
area within one country or even one government, but may include interest groups that are strong
enough or mobilized enough to effectively veto policy in a particular area.  In Tsebelis' system of
counting, veto players with identical policy positions are counted as one actor.  Tsebelis develops
the hypothesis that: The greater the number of veto  players, and the greater the distance between
their policy positions, the more policy stability (and less change) there is likely to be (Tsebelis
1995, 293).
For the purposes of this study, where our concern is with explaining the nature of radical
policy change in pension systems, it is useful to formulate  the corollary to this principle:
10H2 (preliminary): The fewer  the number of veto actors and the less distance between
them, the greater the opportunity  for change in the scope and size of the PAYG pension
system.
'roposal actors.  One limitation of Tsebelis' framework  is that veto actors are often not the only
actors making proposals for reform.  Indeed, veto actors may not have strong or fixed policy
preferences. In some cases, veto actors do not reveal policy preferences until late in the process,
and in others they change positions over time as a result cf side-payments or deliberation and the
consideration of alternative proposals.
Building on  Tsebelis' framework, I  therefore d.-fine and  examine the  importance of
"proposal  actors" in addition to "veto actors" in the policy process.  Proposal actors often have a
separate and independent influence on reform, acting as initellectual  agenda-setters for reform.  In
complex policy areas, where veto actors do not have the relevant expertise to develop their own
concrete policy positions, they may rely on proposal actors to determine policy preferences for
them, or to set the general terms of debate and the range of policy options in a particular area.
While veto actors have an institutional, partisan, or situational veto over reform, proposal actors
play a critical role by introducing intellectual innovations, setting agendas, and  defining the
range of feasible policy outcomes.  Some proposal actors are also veto actors, and this clearly
strengthens their position in the policy process, but sonne are not, and still manage to have a
substantial influence on the outcomes of reform. To reformulate Tsebelis' hypothesis, the greater
the number of veto and proposal actors, and the greater the distance between them, the less
tadical policy change is likely to be.
H2 (revised): The  fewer the number of veto and proposal actors and the lesser the distance
between them, the greater the opportunity  for  change in the scope and size of the PA  YG
pension system.
]Enterest  groups.  Interest groups may be of two types: civil society interest groups that represent
independent, non-state actors, and state interest groups that represent the interests of some part of
the state bureaucracy. Interest groups that wish to access the policy process can attempt to act as
veto or proposal actors or as both.  Often interest groups are not concerned with the overall shape
of reform, and do not develop fully-elaborated reform proposals, but instead seek to alter some
-Facet  of reform that is of particular interest to them.  Regardless of their objectives, interest
groups find their opportunities restricted by the structure of political institutions.  Some political
'institutions offer  better  access to  critical  "veto  point-s" in  the  policy  process  than  others
('Immergut 1992), or privilege certain types of access.  For instance, an interest group that has
close relations with a  dominant party in parliament may have a  good chance of influencing
policy in a parliamentary system, but little chance in a presidential system.  This  leads to the
following hypothesis:
H3:  The  impact of  interest groups  depends on  their relations  to  and  distance from
important  veto  and proposal  actors,  their ability  to  mobilize constituencies to  exert
pressure  at  critical  veto points,  and  their abil;Nty  to  act as  veto or proposal  actors
themselves.
2.3  INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND IDEAS
While only domestic actors have veto power over reform, international organizations
often have a powerful agenda-setting capacity, through the formulation and diffusion of reform
ideas.  In developing country social policy, it is impossible to ignore the role of international
institutions,  particularly  the  work  of  the  World  Bank  in  producing  "politically-relevant
11intellectual innovations" (see Figure 2).  Deacon's work on the evolution of a  "global social
policy discourse" provides one way of assessing the role of international organizations (Deacon
1997).  Deacon shows that international organizations -- and individual consultants and  staff
members within them -- contribute diverse perspectives that together form part of a global social
policy discourse that constrains national policy. International organization also intervene directly
in national social policy processes:  the World Bank offers advice on social safety nets and sets
conditions on social policy loans; the IMF imposes loan conditions that often limit social sector
budgets; the European Union distributes structural funds and  promotes an  obligatory social
chapter; USAID funds policy development and public outreach.  Deacon argues that the World
Bank and IMF have been the most influential international actors in postcommunist social sector
reform (Deacon 1997).
World Bank involvement in postcommunist social sector reform therefore can be divided
into two categories: contributions to policy discourse and direct policy interventions (see Figure
2).  World Bank direct  interventions include all forms of technical assistance, including the
sending of missions, financial assistance, and the secondment of Bank employees to  national
policy offices. For instance, in Poland a World Bank official was appointed head of the Office of
the Plenipotentiary (OP) for  Social Security Reform.  Other  activities of the  OP  also were
supported by the World Bank.  Interventions of this sort provide one major channel by which
policy innovations are transmitted by the Bank to particular national arenas. Global social policy
discourse  includes  publications  and  conferences  sponsored by  the  World  Bank,  and  the
production of ideas. Both direct policy interventions and contributions to global social policy
discourse play a powerful role at different times, and in different ways. This leads to a fourth
hypothesis:
H4: The World Bank influences  pension reform through direct interventions and through
contributions to global social policy discourse. Greater exposure to  World Bank ideas
and greater  World Bank intervention in policy planning should therefore lead to more
fundamental pension reform.
This section has developed a set of hypotheses based on the Weir-Skocpol model, and recent
work by Tsebelis and  Immergut on how political institutions structure the  opportunities for
policy change.  However, a major economic reform process really cannot be captured by a static
model, but has to be understood as a dynamic process that evolves across time.
3  STAGES  AND  TRADEOFFS  IN  THE  POLICY  PROCESS
The pension reform policy process can be divided into three distinct stages: commitment-
building, coalition-building,  and  implementation.  Deliberation  at each  stage  in  the  policy
process has different purposes, actors, and outcomes, and takes place in different deliberative
fora.  This section describes the three stages of the policy process and the major deliberative fora.
It suggests that policymakers face two sets of tradeoffs in reform deliberation: tradeoffs across
policy stages and tradeoffs across deliberative fora.  A brief description of the three policy stages,
fora, and tradeoffs is followed by a discussion of the specific timeline of reform in Kazakhstan,
Hungary, and Poland.
Commitment-building. The policy process for pension reform begins with a variety of actors,
each with distinct interests and points of view, trying to decide whether to make a commitment to
reform.  In  the commitment-building phase, the main actors are government agencies, their
consultants (including those from international organizations), institutional veto actors, political
parties, and in some cases civil society interest groups. Commitment-building can be considered
to have started when the government first takes official action towards developing a pension
reform proposal.  Often, a multiplicity of government agencies and consultants present a range of
fundamentally different  proposals for  pension  reform at  this  stage.  The  distance  between
12proposals may vary, but in postcommunist Europe, they have tended to be polarized into ones
that  call  for  a  "rationalization"  of  the  existing  pension  system,  and  ones  that  call  for
"fundamental reform"  (Rutkowski  1998; Nelson  1998).  Reformers' objectives  during  the
commitment-building stage are to persuade key veto and proposal actors to support reform, and
f:br the government to  adopt a single proposal for pension reform through a vote of the full
cabinet.  Reaching this point, however, involves extensive bargaining, debate, and negotiation,
during which conflicting conceptions of the public interest and the weight of special interests
come into play.  Fundamental decisions about the nature of reform are usually made at this stage.
In all the cases studied here, government commitment  to reform was signaled by the creation of a
special office or working group for pension reform. I define the creation of such a special office,
with a clear mandate to develop and pursue a single type of pension reform, as the culmination of
the commitment-building phase.
Coalition-building.  Once government commitment to a single program of pension reform has
been secured, a  second phase  of the deliberative process begins, that  of  coalition-building.
(Government  commitment to  reform is often not enough.  Legislation is usually required, so
pension reform must be carried out through a legislative process, in which the rules of legislative
procedure must be followed.  In all cases, this means getting the reform passed by majority vote
in parliament.  The legislative process empowers partisan veto actors -- the parties that make up a
governing or single-issue coalition in parliament.
Because pension systems depend on the participation anid  trust of the population, interest
groups cannot be  ignored either.  Some interest groups may be  effective veto actors, others
proposal actors, others potential future veto actors, and others possible sources of anti-reform
mobilization. Pension reform requires spontaneous mass cormpliance  to  succeed, so any anti-
reforrn mobilization is a major threat.  A public information camnpaign  is usually launched to win
"diffuse" support from the population for reform, and to provide necessary information about
h1ow  to participate in the reformed system. The two objectives of the coalition-building stage are:
1. To get the reforn  passed in parliament; and 2. To win diffiuse  support of the population and
organized interest groups to prevent anti-reform  mobilization.
][mplementation. A further deliberative stage begins with implementation of reform legislation.
Although implementation normally is not considered a stage in the policy-making process, it
should be.  Numerous issues arise in the early implemenatation  stages that were not resolved in
reform legislation, and cry out for further regulation or legisLation. Deliberation at this  stage
tends to accentuate the role of business organizations involved in implementation, and interest
groups that may be aggrieved by some aspect of the reform.  'Wholly  new actors often enter the
process,  in  some  cases  created by  implementation.  Amendments and  changes during  the
implementation  phase  often  result.  The  implementation  phase  never  properly  ends,  but
deliberation within it is likely to be particularly intense in the first few years.
3.1  TRADEOFFS  ACROSS  DELIBERATIVE  FORA
Deliberation amnong  actors in the social policy process takes place through three distinct
types of deliberative fora, whose institutional structure marks the course of negotiation:
1.  Governmental bodies
2.  Parliamentary bodies
3.  Public deliberative bodies
Governmental bodies  include the full cabinet, economric  comnmittees  of the  government, and
special pension reform working groups.  Parliamentary deliberative bodies  include standing
13committees of the parliament, special parliamentary committees, party caucuses, and plenary
sessions.  Public deliberative bodies include the tripartite councils for  social and  economic
accord  that  are  common  in  postcommunist  Europe, and  other  bodies  that  bring  together
representatives of government and non-state actors.
It  is  important to  point  out  that  all  pension  reform  actors  (government  agencies,
consultants, political parties, business and civil society organizations)  may engage in deliberation
in multiple fora and that some actors are privileged in one forum as opposed to another.  For
instance, deliberation in parliament tends to empower partisan veto actors, while deliberation
within the government may focus on the concerns of key ministers, and deliberation in public
bodies may empower certain interest groups over others.  International organizations and their
consultants are  generally  most  influential  in  deliberation within  governmental  bodies  and
weakest in public deliberative bodies, although they can counteract this weakness by funding
public relations campaigns that have an impact on debate in all three fora.
Secondly,  while  reforn  programs  may  have  to  be  debated  in  all  three  types  of
deliberative fora, deliberation in one forum may substitute for debate in another, to some extent.
For instance,  trade  union  representatives may  agree not  to  hold  up  pension  legislation  in
parliarnent if it is first negotiated in a national tripartite council.  Opponents of reform within the
government may choose  not  to  raise objections in  the cabinet, but  instead  to  pursue  their
concerns in parliament, where they have a greater chance of success.  Likewise, exclusion of
actors from negotiations in one deliberative forum will often cause them to seek representation in
another. This discussion suggests the following hypothesis:
H5:. There are tradeoffs across deliberative  fora.  In particular,
X  Choice  of  deliberative fora  systematically influences  reform  outcomes  because
certain  fora  empower certain types of actors;
a  Exclusion of actors from  one deliberative forum  will often cause them to be more
active in another.
3.2  TRADEOFFS  ACROSS  POLICY  STAGES
In addition to tradeoffs across deliberative fora, path dependency across policy phases
means that  developments in one phase have repercussions in succeeding phases.  This  again
implies  tradeoffs  across  phases.  In  particular,  veto  and  proposal  actors  excluded  from
deliberation at one stage in the policy process often become more active in a later stage.  Since
basic design issues are decided at the commitment-building stage, excluding one or more veto or
proposal actors from deliberation at this stage is expected to produce agreement around a more
radical reformn  proposal more quickly.  However, excluded veto or proposal actors have more
reason to mobilize during the coalition-building or implementation stages, and therefore may be
able to block or delay reform, or exact greater concessions at these stages.  Including actors
earlier might reduce their anti-reform mobilization, but  cause less radical or  slower reform.
These considerations suggest the following hypothesis:
H6:  There are tradeoffs across phases of reform. In particular,
a  The smaller the number of veto and proposal actors involved in design of reform at
the commitment-building  phase, the  faster and more radical the reform.
*  However, excluding veto and proposal actors at the commitment-building  phase may
cause them to mobilize effectively against reform in later phases.
14*  Inclusive negotiation of basic design issues at the commitment-building phase  will
reduce the potential threats to reform at later stages, but at the expense of more time
and less radical reform.
3.3  TIMELINE  OF PENSION REFORM IN THREE COUNTRIES,
The timelines for the commitment- and coalition-building phases of the policy process in
'Kazakhstan, Hungary and Poland are mapped in Table 2.  Time provides a useful proxy for the
inclusiveness of the deliberative process and the strength of veto actors at particular stages.  Time
also represents one of the greatest costs of reform. The three cases presented here exhibit a wide
variation  in deliberative time.  This variation correlates with major differences in the number and
distance  of  veto  and  proposal  actors  involved  in  pension  reform  in  the  three  countries.
Kazakhstan had the shortest deliberative process, of seven months, while Hungary occupies an
intermediate position, and Poland had the longest deliberative process.  The following section
introduces  comparisons between the three cases across time, stages and deliberative fora.
TABLE  2. TIMELINE  OF  PENSION  REFORM  IN  THREE  COUNT]RIES
Kazakhstan  Hungary  Poland  I  Poland  2
I  Government  takes  official  action  to
begin planning  reform  November  1996  June 1.995  December  1994
2  Government  establishes  special
office/working  group  solely  November  1996  April 1996  April 1996
responsible  for  pension  reform
3  Government  approves  unified  reform  March  1997  May [996  April 1997
project
4  Reform  laws  submitted  to parliament  May 1997  May 1997  June 1997  May 1998
5  Parliament  passes  reform  laws  June 1997  July 1997  August  1997  December  1998
6  Reform  implemented  January  1998  January  1998  January  1999
7  Commitment-building  (1-2)  0 months  10  months  16  months
8  Coalition-building  (2-5)  7 months  15  months  32 months
9  Total  (1-5)  7 months  25 months  48 months
3.3.1  COMMITMENT-BUILDING
Commitment-building is the process by which a  government comes to  agree on the
fundamental design of a pension reform program.  Time to commitment varies considerably
across the three cases, from 0 months in Kazakhstan to 10 months in Hungary to 16 months in
Poland.  A large part of the reason why Kazakhstan rnoved so swiftly is that it had few veto
actors and thus avoided extensive debate within the government over its commitment to reform.
Kazakhstan also was quick to establish a single governamental  commission for pension reform,
under the  direct authority  of  the prime  minister, with full approval  of the  president.  The
commission was headed by a leading reformer, Grigori Marchenko, and included officials from
all relevant government agencies.
15Governments in  Hungary  and  Poland took  far  longer  to  reach  a  clear  government
commitment to  pension  reform.  This  was because of the  relative multiplicity  of veto and
proposal actors involved in the commitment-building  process.  In Hungary, pension reform plans
were elaborated by three separate governmental agencies: a working group in the Ministry of
Finance with World Bank assistance, a group of experts in the Ministry of Welfare cooperating
with German consultants, and the Pension Insurance Fund, a quasi-autonomous state agency
whose supervisory board included elected representatives of the major trade unions and business
associations.  Attempts to reconcile these three plans took 10 months. In Poland, commitment to
a single reform proposal was held up for 16 months by a dispute between the Minister of Labor
and Social Policy and the Minister of Finance over basic design and the objectives of reform.
The Minister of Labor's proposal called for a set of amendments to the first-pillar state system,
while the Minister of Finance advocated setting up a funded second pillar and re-regulation of
the voluntary third pillar.  Their mutual vetoes resulted in a stalemate within the governnent
until a new prime minister was appointed and he replaced the Labor Minister with one who was
sympathetic to multi-pillar reform. At that point, the government established a special Office of
the Plenipotentiary for Social Security Refonn, at first under the authority of the new Labor
Minister, and later under the prime minister's office, a major turning point in the reform effort.
Commitment-building in Hungary and Poland took longer than in Kazakhstan because
their political institutions empowered a broader range of veto and proposal actors.  In Hungary
and Poland, with their parliamentary democratic institutions, government decisions require a
majority vote of the cabinet, and thus individual ministers leading sufficient factions can play an
effective veto role in the  commitment-building phase. Kazakhstan's authoritarian institutions
centralize power in  the presidency and make individual government ministers less  likely to
formulate alternative reform proposals. Civil society organizations also face greater sanctions for
voicing opposition in Kazakhstan and fewer opportunities to access the policy process.  Since
pension reform deliberations were kept secret, civil society groups did not even know about the
progress of governmental pension reform proposals until a commitment had been reached. Tight
information controls in the Kazakh case reduced the scope for open  debate and deliberation
within and outside the government.  However, Kazakhstan also made an important strategic
decision to establish a special working group for pension reform from the outset, inviting all the
major players to the table, and thus heading off the potential for individual agencies to work on
their own independent programs. In the other two cases, the lack of a single working group early
on and the existence of multiple governmental veto and proposal actors caused internal deadlock
in the commitment-building phase.
3.3.2  COALITION-BUILDING
Poland (32 months) and Hungary (15 months) also had longer consultative processes in the
coalition-building  stage  than  Kazakhstan  (7  months),  for  similar  reasons.  Kazakhstan's
authoritarian political institutions reduced the number of veto actors and enabled the government
to push its reform program quickly through the public deliberative and legislative processes.
Neither the parliament nor any political party were veto actors in Kazakhstan because of a clause
in the Kazakh constitution that allows the president to force some urgent legislation through
parliament under threat of dissolution. After four months of deliberation within the government
special commission for pension reform, the Kazakh reform plan was published in the press in
March 1997. Public deliberation continued until May 1997, when a slightly revised program was
presented to parliament and passed in June 1997 with minor changes.  Negotiation with actors
outside the closed special commission in Kazakhstan took only three months.
Hungary's coalition-building process was  considerably slower.  Hungary  spent  nine
months elaborating reform proposals and winning the support of ministers and partisan veto
16actors within the government coalition.  At the start of 1997, the government spent four months
Ln  public deliberation, including discussions in Hungary"s  tripartite council and meetings with a
wide range of public inLerest  groups, social institutions, and political parties.  As a result of this
prior work, and the fact that the government had a large niajorily in parliament, the parliamentary
process in Hungary went exceptionally quickly, for a parliamentary democracy.  Approximately
two months after being submitted, the major pension reform laws were passed by parliament, for
a total of 15 months, compared to seven in Kazakhstan.
Poland had the longest coalition-building process, in part because the full set of reform
legislation could not be pushed through before the end of the parliamentary term in September
1997.  The center-left coalition government included strong internal factions that opposed the
reform, necessitating a single-issue coalition with one of the main opposition liberal parties in
parliament. In this context, the new plenipotentiary  decided to pursue the least controversial part
of the reform legislation first, with provisions that would tie azny  future government to a specific
timetable for reform (Hausner 1998).  Three laws were passed in August 1997, but two of the
most controversial laws were left for the next government tco  prepare.  In the second stage of
coalition-building in Poland, parliamentary deliberation turned into a lengthy ordeal.  Poland's
two-stage process, finally completed in December 1998, resulted in the longest coalition-building
process of the three cases considered here. Poland's numerous veto and proposal actors, changing
over time and across electoral cycles, contributed to its length.
3.3.3  IMPLEMENTATION
In all three cases, important regulatory decisions were taken after the approval of pension
reform legislation and after the start of reform implementation itself.  In Kazakhstan, several
important pension reform regulations were written after the official start of implementation.  In
Hungary,  important  changes  in  the  pension  reform  law  were  made  post-hoc  by  a  new
government, and in Poland several aspects of reform, including negotiations on special privileges
and a law on  a national actuary were debated after the passage  of the main pension reform
legislation. In all three cases, deliberation and policy-making continued into the implementation
stage.
New actors also emerged in the implementation stage and pushed for amendments to the
pension system.  In Kazakhstan, for instance, trade unions were quiescent throughout the brief
deliberative process, but began to mobilize against reform after legislation was passed, pushing
for a reinstatement of special pension privileges. In Hungary and Poland, newly-formed pension
funds became major players in the implementation stage, after having been relatively uninvolved
earlier. In Hungary, new partisan veto actors in the early implementation stage caused a reversal
of some key aspects of the reform.
Because of tradeoffs across policy phases, problems vvith  implementation are sometimes
related to the exclusion of potential veto and proposal actors at earlier phases.  Kazakhstan,
which had the fewest institutional veto players, and consequently the fastest coalition-building
stage and the most radical reform, also faces the greatest clhallenges  in implementing reform.
Hungary's commitment- and coalition-building processes focused on gaining consensus within
one coalition govermment  and its affiliated civil society organizations, but  experienced policy
reversals when a different coalition came to power duiring implementation.  Poland, with the
most drawn out commitment- and coalition-building processes, may have the least conflictual
implementation, since all major parties have supported reform at one time or another.  Although
only time will tell, inclusiveness may enhance efficiency of implementation.
174  IMPACTS OF DELIBERATION
How  have  political-institutional structures and  processes  affected reform  outcomes?
When  analyzing  outcomes,  it  is  important to  distinguish between three  types  of  changes
produced through deliberation among proposal and veto actors across tirne:
1.  technical changes
2.  public-interest changes
3.  special-interest changes
Technical changes are the most  numerous outcomes of the policy process.  As  the plan  is
debated,  it is often enriched by numerous amendments and  provisions offered by  consulted
parties with access to specialized sources of information.  They include all sorts of alterations
intended mainly to improve the efficiency and technical coherence of the program, but tend not
to have broad distributive impacts.  This is one of the most important reasons for a sufficient
deliberative process.  Extensive deliberation holds the danger of watering down reform, but it
may also lead to substantial improvements (cf. Palacios and Rocha 1998, 20).
I define "public-interest changes" as changes that have broad distributive impacts, but
ones that are either universal or tend to encompass a wide cross-section of groups involved in the
reform, for instance changes to the retirement age.  Such changes do not respond mainly to
specific interest group demands, but rather to differing conceptions of the public good.  Public
interest considerations lead to some of the most controversial debates among veto actors in the
pension reform process.  Key among these is the debate over whether a three-pillar pension
system, including a large second pillar, is in the public interest.  This depends on an individual
country's  situation (Holzmann  1998).  The process of a society debating the interests of its
citizens now and in the fature is bound to be controversial. Similarly, the retirement age, which
is something that affects all working citizens, has proven to be a sharply controversial issue.
Often, these debates are not animated by the attacks of special interest groups on obvious public
interests, but  rather by  differing conceptions of the public  interest held by  different groups
pursuing what they believe is the common good.  Proposal and veto actors tend to  represent
different conceptions of the public interest.
Special interest  group changes are usually easy to  identify: they  include all types  of
special provisions that affect one or a  small group of interested parties, for instance, special
retirement provisions for miners, military officers, or judges.
5  PROCESS  AND OUTCOMES  IN KAZAKHSTAN,  HUNGARY,  AND POLAND
The following case studies analyze how different policy legacies, political institutions,
veto and proposal actors, and international organizations affected the pension reform process and
outcomes in three postcommunist countries.  Each case concludes with an evaluation of the six
hypotheses developed in the previous sections in light of the evidence presented in the case.
These hypotheses are restated below:
HI: Policy legacies influence  present reform choices. In particular,
*  Countries with higher implicit pension debt will choose a smaller private pillar and
retain a larger PA YG  public pillar, in other words, less radical reform.
*  Other pension reform design elements will build upon the legacies of pre-existing
pension institutions.
18H2:  The fewer  the number of  veto and proposal  actors and the  lesser the distance
between them, the greater the opportunity  for  charnge  in the scope and size of the PAYG
pension system.
H3:  The impact of  interest groups  depends on  their relations to  and  distance from
important veto and proposal  actors, their ability to  mobilize constituencies to  exert
pressure  at  critical veto points,  and  their ability to  act  as veto or proposal  actors
themselves.
H4: The World Bank influences  pension reform through direct interventions and through
contributions to global social policy discourse. Greater exposure to  World Bank ideas
and greater World Bank intervention in policy planning should therefore lead to more
fundamental pension reform.
H5:  There are tradeoffs across deliberative  fora.  In particular,
*  Choice  of  deliberative fora  systematically  influences reform  outcomes  because
certain  fora empower certain types of actors;
*  Exclusion of actors from  one deliberative forum wvill  often cause them to be more
active in another.
H6:  There are tradeoffs across phases of reform. In particular,
*  The smaller the number of veto and proposal' actors involved in design of reform at
the commitment-building  phase, the  faster and more radical the reform.
*  However, excluding veto and proposal actors at the commitment-building  phase may
pose threats and require greater compromises in later phases.
*  Inclusive negotiation of basic design issues at the commitment-building phase  will
reduce the potential threats to reform at later stages, at the expense of time and less
radical reform.
Kazakhstan, Hungary and Poland display wide variation in their policy legacies (discussed
above; see Table 1) and their political institutions.  Kazakhstan is a presidential system which
"gives the president and his office control over almost every aspect of the republic's political and
economic life" (Olcott 1997, 106).  The president is really the sole veto actor in the system,
although in the case of pension reform, he allocated veto power to a special working group under
the authority of the prime minister, whom the president appoints.  Parliament is no longer an
institutional veto actor in Kazakhstan since the  1995 constitution did away with its emerging
veto power (Olcott  1997, 112).  Hungary and Poland, by contrast, are mainly parliamentary
democracies (although Poland also has a directly-elected  president), in which governments are
formed by coalitions of parliamentary parties. This gives partisan veto actors a much greater role
in policy formulation.  Civil society interest groups also have greater opportunities for access to
the  policy  process  in  parliamentary democracies, through  their  ties  with  political  parties.
Political institutions determine the number of institutional ancl  partisan veto and proposal actors
in each case, making the policy environment in Hungary and Poland far more challenging for
fundamental reform.
Case studies are organized by hypothesis and policy phase.  The first section of each case
study discusses the policy legacies that shaped reform, with a particular focus on implicit pension
debt.  A second section covers the commitment-building,  process, focusing on the main veto and
proposal actors within the government and the role of international organizations, including the
World Bank, in providing policy advice.  The third section, on coalition-building, analyzes the
process of deliberation with interest groups in public and parliamentary bodies, with an emphasis
on tradeoffs  across deliberative fora.  The fourth section, on  implementation, looks  at the
19outcomes  of  reform,  and  any  major  policy  changes that  occurred  during  implementation,
analyzing them in the context of tradeoffs across policy stages.  Finally, a concluding section
reviews evidence from each case that speaks to each of the main hypotheses.
5.1  KAZAKHSTAN
5.1.1  POLICY  LEGACIES
At the outset of reform, Kazakhstan spent substantially less on pensions as a proportion
of GDP than either Hungary or Poland (see Table 1), and had a smaller implicit pension debt
(IPD).  James (1998b) estimates Kazahstan's implicit pension debt (the present value of accrued
rights of pensioners and workers under the old system) at 88% of GDP, compared to 213% in
Hungary and 220% in Poland.  Yet despite smaller pension obligations, Kazakhstan experienced
a dramatic pension arrears crisis.  Kazakhstan, like Russia and Romania, had initially controlled
pension spending by accumulating substantial payment arrears to current pensioners (Cangiano
et al.  1998, 10) and by not indexing pensions to keep up with  inflation.  In  1996 and  1997,
Kazakh pension arrears were so severe that mass protests of pensioners broke out in cities across
the country.  A collapse in state ability to tax was a large part of the problem, reflecting the
extent of the so-called gray economy, as well as a steep decline in production from Soviet times.
Few small private businesses paid any pension payroll tax at all.  Mass protests and  system
failure seemed to call for radical measures, and the Kazakh government responded with a radical
pension reform, introduced in tandem with an effort to pay off all existing pension arrears.
5.1.2  COMMITMENT-BUILDING
Proposal  actor  Veto actor
Working  group  x  x
President  x
Total  1  2
Kazakhstan began its pension reform process with full governmental commitment to
reform.  Its ability to do so reflected the small number of institutional veto actors in its strong
presidential political system.  With authoritarian political institutions and a  centralized policy
style, Kazakhstan  was  able  to  circumvent open  disputes  between  different  ministries  and
government agencies that broke out in the first stages of commitment-building in Poland and
Hungary.  Reformers achieved this by winning presidential approval for the reform at the outset
and setting up a special interministerial commission for pension reform that would monopolize
proposal authority within the govermnent, under the political sponsorship of the prime minister.
This meant that the Kazakh reform was dominated from the start by one proposal actor, whereas
Hungary and Poland had several competing ones.
The reform process started in November 1996 when President Nursultan Nazarbaev and
Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin appointed Grigori Marchenko Chairman of the National
Securities Commission and Natalya Korzhova head of a newly consolidated Ministry of Labor
and Social Protection.  Marchenko was put in charge of a special government working group on
pension  reform that  included  the  Prime Minister, Deputy  Prime Minister  and  Minister of
Finance, the Chairman of the Central Bank, the Minister of Labor and Social Protection, the head
of the National Securities Commission, two persons from the private sector, and two members of
20parliament.  Marchenko had previously worked at the National Bank of Kazakhstan, and was a
protege of reformist Prime Minister Kazhegeldin. Marchenko reports that it was important to get
people from different agencies to head off potential misunderstfandings  and lack of coordination
(lown the road (interview, July 1, 1998).
International organizations were also involved, providing both policy ideas and direct
technical assistance to the pension reform working group.  Chief reformer Grigori Marchenko
reports being heavily influenced in his thinking about pensioni  reform by reading Averting the
Old Age Crisis and attending World Bank-sponsored conferences (interview with Marchenko,
July 1, 1998).  The basic framework for pension reform in Kazakhstan was thus transmitted
largely through reformers' own interpretations of  World Bank  policy ideas,  without direct
technical assistance from the Bank at the early stages. Direct technical assistance was provided
by USAID.  The World Bank sent an expert advisory mission to Kazakhstan in May 1997, after
major design decisions had been made.  However, the World Bank later decided to loan $300m
to Kazakhstan to implement reform.  USAID technical assistance gave the main proposal actor
an unparalleled advantage. Given the lack of technical expertise in Kazakhstan and the lack of
resources on the part of  civil society groups, 'no  one else was technically in  a position to
develop a model'  for analyzing or developing different pension reform proposals (interview
with Marchenko, July 1, 1998), and thus the working group easily dominated expert debate.
Secrecy also  enhanced the  working group's monopoly on reform proposals,  sharply
restricting the ability of civil society and other interest groups to influence reform.  Even high-
ranking govermment  officials in affected ministries were not infiormed  of the progress of working
group deliberations.  This allowed the government to develop a more radical reform prograrn
more quickly than in other transition countries, although at the cost of widespread disapproval
from civil society groups and anti-reform  mobilization during implementation.
After four months of deliberation, the working group oni  pension reformn  had prepared the
outlines of a radical, three-pillar reform, in the form of an eight-page 'draft concept' that was
published in the Kazakh press on March 20,  1997.  In essence, the draft concept proposed
changing the Kazakh pension system from a pay-as-you-go system paid for by a 25.5% payroll
tax to  a  funded system  based  on a  10% employee contribution, with  a  minimum pension
guarantee. The pay-as-you-go system would  be phased  out  over  a  ten-year period.  Later
amendments, however, extended the transition period. Disability and survivor benefits would be
transferred to  the  central budget, all  special privileges eliminated, and  new  recording  and
financial mechanisms put in place.  Private pension funds would collect and invest employee
contributions, aiding the development of Kazakh capital markets.
Kazakhstan's commitment-building process was swift, marked by the quick formation of
a working group on pension reform that brought together all the key governmental actors.  Full
presidential support and the lack of alternative veto or proposal actors within the government
enabled the working group to produce the most fundamental reform of the three cases. Later
stages of public and parliamentary deliberation did not substantially change the basic outlines of
reform, agreed in the working group's secretive four-month session.
5.1.3  COALITION-BUILDING
21Proposal  actor  Veto actor
Working  group  x  x
President  x
Total  1  2
The coalition-building process in Kazakhstan was characterized by cursory public and
parliamentary deliberation.  Although the government was obliged to submit the reform program
to some debate, Kazakhstan's strong presidential system meant that there were no real partisan or
civil society veto or proposal actors.  Parliament was the main deliberative forum, but had no
actual veto power. Interest groups still managed to influence the process to some extent, but only
within the bounds of what the main veto actors would allow.
The Kazakh government allocated two months for public discussion of the new pension
system.  Public  deliberation began on  March 20, when the  government published its  draft
concept paper in the press, and lasted until May 12, when the government approved a revised
concept for pension reforn.  During this  time, a deputy minister of labor and social affairs
initiated the solicitation and consideration of public commentary, collecting approximately 200
letters and interest group comments.  However, the same deputy minister, a former opposition
trade union leader, notes that the government had not previously intended to consult with interest
groups and that this was undertaken on her own personal initiative (interview with Sivriukova,
July 6, 1998). In addition, two teams of government representatives toured the country in April
and May to promote the new pension reform concept and gather public reactions, meetings that
were widely reported in the press.  Public deliberations also took place  in tripartite  council
meetings  in  April.  The  main  trade  union  federation  expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the
government proposal and rejected the three-pillar design (Kovcheg, 1 May 1997).  The leader of
the second leading trade union accepted reform, because he believed it to be a fait accompli.
Still, trade unions criticized the rushed deliberative process, saying it deprived interest groups of
voicing their concerns (Kovcheg, 1 May 1997).
The government ignored widespread public opposition expressed in the press and public
opinion polls.  Groups such as the Federation of Kazakh Trade Unions, the association of labor
and war  veterans, and  several pensioners associations came  out  against the reform.  Some
government social security officials also expressed opposition to the reform (Kazakhstanskaya
Pravda 25 April 1997), reflecting limited support and deliberation within the government itself.
There is no evidence that the government concerned itself with rallying diffuse support of the
population, as only  limited resources, mostly provided by USAID, were allocated to  public
relations and public awareness campaigns. Public support would have been difficult to obtain in
any case, since the government was dealing at the same time with  a massive pension arrears
crisis, causing mass protests around the country.'
The  government  chose  to  tradeoff  extensive deliberation  and  coalition-building  for
quicker implementation of reform.  Its main imperative was to submit pension reform legislation
to parliament in time to begin implementation in January 1998.  Legislative drafting had started
already in April, while public deliberation was under way.  Nonetheless, deliberation in the
various public fora listed above did produce a handful of changes. Most of these were technical,
including ten to twenty instances of rewording for consistency and technical reasons, and about
' In one instance, on August 18, 1997, a crowd of several hundred angry pensioners demonstrated against pension
arrears in the central square of Taraz, a city in south Kazakhstan. They gathered in front of the mayor's office,
blocking traffic on one of the city's main thoroughfares for three hours, chanting slogans including, "Give us
pensions!  ", "We want to eat!  ", and "We don't believe you!  You lured away our kopeks!  " (Express K, August 19,
1997).
22t.n  alterations made after consultation with various internationral  organizations.  However, four
new provisions clearly reflected the impact of special interest groups, while seven appeared to
respond to broadly-expressed public interest concerns.
Initially,  the  Kazakh  reform  intended  to  eliminate  all  special  pension  privileges.
Ilowever, between March and May 1997, military and internal affairs officers managed to make
their voices heard.  Four new provisions granted special exemptions and benefits to the military,
employees of the Agencies of Internal Affairs and the State Investigation Committee (former
K'GB). The so-called "power ministries" were the only lobby able to gain a guarantee of special
treatment under the proposed new system.  The May 1997 draft exempted anyone with ten years
of service or more from being affected by the change to the new pension system.  The power
rministries  also won a lower retirement age and higher benefits ]ior  their employees under the new
s;ystem. New entrants into the military, security, and intelligence services and those with less
than ten years of service were awarded a 20% contribution to their pension accumulation funds,
paid for by the state, double the 10% for all other categories of employees.
Several  changes  also  addressed  broad  public  concerns  expressed  through  multiple
(leliberative channels. Kazakhstan's privatization experience left the public with a low regard for
private investment funds, which translated into mistrust;  of private pension funds.  This came
across  clearly in  the  press  and  public  meetings held  arouind the  country  (interview  with
Marchenko, July 1, 1998). In response, the government introduced in its revised program a State
Accumulation Fund that citizens could chose over private, non-state accumulation funds.  The
State Accumulation Fund would provide greater security through tighter investment controls and
a state guarantee, with the tradeoff of potentially lower returns.  This provision proved to be very
important as more than 85% of citizens initially entrusted their contributions to this state fund,
severely limiting the extent of private management in the funded pillar.  The State Accumulation
'Fund's  dominant share of the "private" market had declirned  to approximately 70% of total assets
by late 1999.
The May 1997 draft concept also promised price indexation of benefits to beneficiaries of
the old state system.  Although legally, this would reduce indexation levels by supplanting wage
indexation, the March 1997 draft had contained no reference to indexation at all, and in practice a
oonsistent price  indexation  would benefit  current pensioners  more  than  the  ad  hoc  wage
indexation of previous years.
The May  1997 draft increased from  10% to  15% the amount of payroll contribution
allocated to the old system, and increased from 10 to 15 years the length of time to phase out this
tax.  Although this could be regarded as a technical finance question, the amount of money the
government collects had a direct impact on outlays in the past.  When insufficient funds were
available, the government had not paid pensions, but rather allowed arrears  to accumulate. Given
this track record, this increase in contribution rates to the ol0(  system will likely have a strong
distributive impact in favor of current pensioners.  The May 1997 draft also included a vital
promise to repay pension arrears, a condition demanded by the World Bank for its continued
assistance to Kazakhstan and by USAID to reestablish confidence in the pension system (USAID
1997).  The new concept reduced from 30 to  25 (men) and 20  (women) the requisite work
periods for minimum pension eligibility under the new systern. It promised no decline in take-
home pay as a result of the introduction of a 10% employee contribution to the accumulation
funds.  Finally, the new draft promised to retain the value of disability and survivors' pensions
transferred to the state budget, although the government probably intended this as a method of
controlling costs (USAID 1997).
Public deliberation over the concept paper fromrr  its publication in the Kazakh press on
March 20, 1997 to its adoption by the government on May 12, 1997 resulted in only a handful of
changes.  Many of these responded to suggestions made by international organizations, most
23importantly USAID and the World Bank.  Only a small number responded to particular interest
group  or  broadly-expressed  public  concerns,  but  some  major  changes  were  introduced,
particularly the State Accumulation Fund that became the largest pension fund in the first months
of the program, reflecting widespread distrust of private fund managers.  A short period of public
consultation, and the lack of information about the pension reform before March 20 were the
most important limiting factors.
Public discussion of the pension reform issue increased as the plan moved closer to
implementation  and  people  realized  that  the  program  would  affect  their  future  benefits.
However, increased public discussion -- and opposition expressed by most groups, experts, and
the majority of the population in the press and public opinion polls -- had only limited impact on
the outcome of debates in the Mazhilis, Kazakhstan's lower house of parliament.
Parliament was not  a  veto actor in the Kazakh reform, but  it provided  an important
deliberative forum nonetheless.  Kazakhstan's president submitted the draft pension reform law
to parliament marked "urgent," a legislative procedure which meant that the parliament had only
one month to debate, amend, and pass the law or risk being dissolved by the president.  In this
case, the law would be passed by presidential decree.  Threat of dissolution militated against
making major changes to the law.  As one Kazakh newspaper explained in a news anailysis  piece,
the dissolution threat presented deputies (Mazhilis) with a  difficult dilemma: If they voiced
public concerns and voted against pension reform, they would lose their positions and pension
reform would be accepted by presidential decree.  If the deputies voted for reform, they would
face public outrage in upcoming parliamentary elections in September.  Constituents in several
districts had  threatened to  recall deputies who voted for reform (Express K,  29 May  1997).
Mazhilis (deputies) were  truly between a rock  and a hard  place, with  little  opportunity for
effective voice.
Deputies tried to resolve this dilemma by expressing public concerns and even outright
opposition, but  at the  same time  accepting the firm constraints the  government team  placed
around  acceptable compromises.  Parliamentary  deliberation thus  took  two  forms:  purely
rhetorical  deliberation  and  a  parallel,  somewhat more  secretive, process  of  actual  reform
amendments, that were few in number.  Very few parliarnentary deputies spoke in favor of the
reform program and the pro-reform side was represented directly by the government reform team
itself, unusual in parliamentary practice.  One newspaper described the debate as "fervent", but
also said that the attempt of the deputies to paint the reform as "anti-social" tended to break down
when facing the "threatening" faces of the government team (Kustanaiskiye Novosti, 27 May
1997).  Parliament voted overwhelmingly for the reform in June, despite the hostility of many
parliamentarians to the reform in full or in part, in order to guard against dissolution.
In the course of deliberation, the government was forced to  concede a  few points to
parliament.  The main changes were to the system of state guarantees, the phasing out of the old
state programn,  the retirement age, and special benefits.  The Mazhilis voted not to increase the
pension age to 65, as proposed in the government draft, but to end a phased increase already in
progress in 2001, when the retirement age reaches 63 for men and 58 for women.  Mazhilis
deputies had  protested increasing the retirement age further on the grounds of the  low and
decreasing life expectancy in Kazakhstan.
Secondly, the Mazhilis managed to get two special interest provisions included in the
law.  Lower retirement  ages were granted to  a) citizens who lived in zones  of extreme and
maximum radiation risk (the top two radiation risk zones) for not less than ten years between
1949 and 1963 (victims of the Soviet Union's nuclear test program); and b) women in rural areas
with five or more children.  Interestinglv, the Mazhilis voted against extending special pension
benefits to  employees of  the  interior ministry and  state  investigation office  (former KGB)
(Selskaya Novi, 12 June 1997). However, special benefits for these two groups were reinstated in
24the Senate, a body more closely controlled by the president. The government lobbied insistently
for the reinstatement of these special benefits, despite the declared goal of the reform to eliminate
pension privileges (Panorama, 13 June 1997).  Efforts by senators to grant special benefits to
other groups, including steel workers, miners, prosecutors, and judges, failed.
However, the majority of changes introduced by the Mlazhilis  were public-interest and
technical, rather than special-interest,  changes. These included:
*  Eliminating the 15-year period for phasing out the old state pension contribution, allowing
for the prospect of a longer transition period.
*  Obliging the state to guarantee the safety of pension contributions to the state accumulation
fund, although not to the non-state pension funds.
*  Making funeral benefits more generous.
*  Excluding accumulations in non-state pension funds from bankruptcy proceedings.
*  Allowing participants to choose to change funds twice a year, rather than once.
*  Allowing participants to withdraw accumulations  when moving permanently abroad.
*  Promising that any future pension rules would not infr:inge  the interests of contributors.
*  Requiring notification to contributors when a pension fund has its license suspended.
*  Adding  a  few technical  conditions to  the  qualification of  pension  fund  managers  and
procedures for the liquidation of non-state pension funds.
Despite enormous limitations on the legislative process, parliament succeeded in making
a few important alterations to the pension reform law.  Most of these concerned broad public
interests, rather than special interest provisions.  Most importanit  was the decision to extend the
phase-out of the old state system and grant state guarantees for moneys deposited in the State
Accumulation Fund.  This played a role in convincing Kazakh citizens to invest their money in
the more secure state fund, given widespread suspicion of private management companies.  As
mentioned earlier, approximately 85% of contributions were initially directed toward the State
Accumulation Fund.  Limitation of increases in the retirement age (to 63/58) may appear to be
important, but the effects of this provision will not be felit  until 2001.  The government hopes to
continue this phased increase at that point (interview with Marchenko, July 1, 1998).
In the absence of alternative veto or proposal actors, the government managed to preserve
the fundamentals of its reform program throughout the rapid, two-month deliberative process.
Reformers in Kazakhstan set out to implement a Chilean-style pension reform, and were highly
successful in pushing through their initial proposal.  The Kazakh reform eliminates, over time,
the current PAYG system and replaces it with a minimum pension guarantee and a mandatory,
funded, second pillar (Rutkowski 1998).  The law calls, for price-indexation of the minimum
pension twice a year, but no automatic indexation. From the start of reform on January 1, 1998,
all Kazakh employees are required to  invest 10% of their  earnings in  pension  funds.  An
additional 15% of payroll continues to be paid by employers to the existing state defined-benefit
program.  Previously, the 25.5% contribution rate was paid entirely by employers.  Under the
current reform, the contribution rate is reduced slightly, to 25%, with  10% showing up on the
pay-stub of employees as pre-tax income and allocatecd  to  a pension fund of the employee's
choice.  While more than a dozen private pension funds 'have  been set up, more than 85% of all
Kazakh employees initially chose to  invest in the State Accumulation Fund, where assets are
guaranteed.  All workers who contributed for six months intc the old PAYG system also will
receive benefits from it, making the phase-out period last for decades, until the last contributor
dies.  Workers entering the labor force less than six months before the January 1, 1998 starting
dlate  will derive their entire benefit from the new, funded system.
25This fundamental reform of the pension system in Kazakhstan was achieved in  seven
months, from the start of government planning, to the passage of the program in parliament.  Its
passage was possible in a political-institutional context with only a small number of veto actors,
that did not require extensive changes as a result of deliberation with alternative proposal actors
or civil society groups in the coalition-building phase.  Only a small number of special interest
groups managed  to  influence reform outcomes, notably employees of  the  military,  interior
ministry, and security forces.
5.1.4  IMPLEMENTATION
Kazakhstan  passed  the  quickest and  most  radical  reform to  date,  measured  by  the
eventual dominance of the funded share in the new system. However, the accelerated legislative
process  in  Kazakhstan  had  a  negative  impact  on  legislative  quality  and  implementation
(Rutkowski 1998). Major problems included:
*  low contribution compliance in the first months of implementation;
*  failure to set up private pension funds in time for the start of reform;
*  failure to issue all workers necessary identification numbers;
*  more general failure of administrative computer systems;
*  lack of public information on how the new system works;
*  lack of confidence in private pension funds or reform more generally.
Lack of preparedness for reform implementation was directly related to  the speed  of
reform.  The government was determined to  complete pension  reform before parliamentary
elections in September 1998 and presidential elections in 1999.  However, this left little time to
draft legal regulations, inform the public about the program, or allow prospective pension funds
to establish themselves and work out business plans.  All of these things began to  happen as
reform was already under way.
As a result, Kazakhstan experienced serious administrative lapses in the early months of
implementation.  In January 1998, few contributions were collected, leaving the state center for
benefit payments with a substantial deficit.  The first private pension funds were not founded
until  March  1998.  Issuance  of  individual contributors with  social  identification  numbers
continued  several  months  into  the  implementation process.  Many  regulations  needed  to
supplement the pension reform law were drafted while the reform was in progress during 1998,
with USAID providing vital technical assistance (interview with William Baldridge, USAID,
July 2, 1998). For instance, the regulation "on qualification requirements applied to the licensee,
founders and managerial staff of the accumulative pension funds" was registered on February 11,
1998. Similarly, the regulation of the National Pension Agency that provided for issuing licenses
to owners of greater than 25% of shares of open pension funds was registered on March 18,
1998.  Since the coalition-building phase is the time reformers have to draft reform legislation, a
longer and more inclusive process would have allowed better elaboration of proposals.  It would
have allowed bringing important partners, such as the private pension funds, into the process at
an earlier stage, causing implementation to run more smoothly.  Public information about the
reform would have been distributed sooner and more extensively had a longer public debate
occurred, allowing a variety of different actors to plan and adjust their behavior accordingly.  A
longer time-frame might also have allowed complicated technical and information technology
problems to be worked out before the start of reform.
26More inclusive deliberation earlier in the process may have also stymied anti-reform civil
society mobilization in the early implementation stage and irncreased  public confidence in the
new private pillar.  Already in July  1997, air traffic controllers and pilots began efforts to
reinstate special privileges they had enjoyed under the old system (Panorama, 11 July 1997). In
September, miners' representatives  traveled to Almaty to press iheir demands for reinstatement of
special retirement provisions  (Panorama, 5  September 199'7).  In  November, steelworkers,
miners, and pilots threatened a nationwide strike on behalf of those professions that lost special
retirement benefits  (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,  11 November 1997).  These  claims attracted
substantial  support  in  parliament and  in  mid-1998 a  group  of  deputies began  to  consider
]egislation to reinstate a number of categories of special privileges that it had taken away a year
earlier.  USAID simulations showed that workers in hazardous professions had in fact lost about
half their benefits under the reform, but argued that special benefits were not affordable.  Instead,
lJSAID recommended that the government should pay for actually disabled workers through the
disability system (USAID, 23 April 1998). The fact that 85% of Kazakh citizens and enterprises
initially chose to invest in the new State Accumulation Fund over  all private pension  funds
indicates the low level of confidence in the new private pillar.  Implementation problems in
Kazakhstan can thus be divided into two categories: those that reflected a technical lack and
:hose that reflected a legitimacy deficit.
.5.1.5  CONCLUSIONS
This  section reviews  the findings  of the  Kazakhstan case  study in  light of  the  six
hypotheses proposed above.  The first hypothesis was that policy legacies, particularly the level
of implicit pension debt (IPD), influence reform choices, Kazakhstan had the lowest IPD of our
three cases, and, as predicted, the most substantial change to the public PAYG system (James
1998b) and the largest private funded pillar.  The second hypothesis is also borne out by the
Kazakh case. Kazakhstan had the smallest number of institutional veto actors, and consequently
the most rapid reform process and the most radical change.  Interest groups were predicted to
have an impact that depended on their relations to critical veto actors. In Kazakhstan, because of
the small number of veto actors, and particularly the lack of a veto role for parliament or political
parties, interest groups had very little opportunity to  influence the policy process, except for
those connected to the "power ministries" within the government.  Exclusion of civil society
interest  groups  contributed  to  the  radical  nature  of  the  reform,  but  also  to  anti-reform
mobilization during the implementation stage.  The fourlh hypothesis states that the World Bank
influences  pension  reform through  direct  intervention and  policy  discourse.  Interestingly,
Kazakhstan  demonstrates the  power  of  policy  discouLrse  ever  intervention.  Reformers  in
Kazakhstan chose fundamental reform without direct interventions by the World Bank (although
with substantial USAID interventions), but under the influence of ideas expressed in Averting the
Old Age Crisis (World Bank 1994) and World Bank-sponsored conferences. Direct World Bank
interventions in  Kazakhstan came only  after major design  decisions were  made.  The  fifth
hypothesis anticipates tradeoffs across deliberative fora.  In Kazakhstan, no deliberative forum
was particularly powerful, and there does not appear to have been much of a tradeoff between
public deliberation from March to May and parliamentary deliberation from May to June 1997.
Both concerned similar issues and both ended in minor, but different, compromises.  The sixth
hypothesis suggests instead that there are tradeoffs across policy stages, and indeed Kazakhstan
shows this quite clearly.  Rapid deliberation and legisla,tive  drafting in Kazakhstan led to more
radical reform, but one that faced extraordinary problems in implementation, including a failure
to  found  private  pension  funds  before  the  time  they  were  supposed  to  begin  collecting
contributions.  This contributed to low public confidence in private pension funds, displayed by
the preponderance of the State Accumulation Fund in the new  "private" pillar.  Kazakhstan
exhibits both the benefits and drawbacks of a rapid reform with few veto actors, and little input
from alternative proposal actors and interest groups.  As the following two case studies show,
27democratic legislative processes in other postcommunist states have forced reformers to take the
interests and proposals of a variety of actors into account, lessening the extent of change, but
increasing public confidence in the new funded pillar.
5.2  HUNGARY
5.2.1  POLICY  LEGACIES
Hungary had a far higher implicit pension debt than Kazakhstan at the outset of reform,
approximately 213% of GDP (James 1998b), with higher social security payroll tax rates and
approximately double the proportion of GDP spent on pensions (see Table 1). Hungary's pension
system was also experiencing a worsening fiscal balance, that deteriorated by about two percent
of GDP between 1991 and 1995, and was financed out of the state budget.  Payroll tax levels
remained constant at very high levels, while the number of pensioners was increasing rapidly and
the average pension was falling at similar rates, about 25% in real terms between 1990 and 1995
(Cangiano et al. 1998).  Hungary had been adjusting through ad hoc changes in pension levels,
which weakened the link between contributions and benefits.  Both institutionally and fiscally,
the Hungarian pension system faced severe challenges in the middle of the 1990s (see Palacios
and Rocha 1998 for a more complete discussion).
A first step in reform came in 1993, when Hungary created a system of voluntary pension
funds in the form of 'mutual benefit societies,' funded largely by tax breaks.  The idea was to
build civil society by allowing groups of citizens to found their own voluntary pension funds.
Organization of these third pillar funds had a  major structural impact on the course of later
pension reform in Hungary, as interest groups involved in the third pillar lobbied successfully to
have the second pillar in Hungary organized along similar lines, a clear instance of how policy
legacies may influence later reforms.
However, the creation of voluntary pension funds did not address the underlying fiscal
problems of Hungary's pension system.  Further progress on pension reform in Hungary was
stalled until Lajos Bokros was appointed Finance Minister in early 1995. Bokros was appointed
after a year of rule by the Socialist Party under Prime Minister Gyula Horn, during which time
the government wavered over economic reforms.  The Socialist Party had won parliamentary
elections in 1994 on a platform that promised negotiations toward a broad socio-economic pact,
and formed a supermajority coalition with the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats.  The social-
liberal government tried to negotiate a social pact in the second half of 1994 (Hethy 1995).  But
as Hungary edged closer to a fiscal and currency crisis, Prime Minister Horn appointed Bokros
Finance Minister to  implement an austerity plan in  1995 that became known as the Bokros
package. The Bokros package included major cuts in social sector expenditures, especially in
Hungary's system of  family allowances, which had been a primary  source of poverty relief
during the transition.  Two prominent leftists within the Socialist Party, Minister of Welfare Pal
Kovacs and Minister for National Security Affairs Bela Katona, resigned in protest against these
cuts (Financial  Times,  14 March 1995, 2).  This signaled the ascendancy of liberals within the
governing coalition and set the context for a new, more radical approach to social sector reform.
28';.2.2  COMMITMENT-BUILDING
Proposal  actor  Veto actor
Mqinistry  of Finance  x  x
lMinistry  of Welfare  x  x
P'ension  Insurance  Fund  x
Prime  Minister/Socialist  Party  x
Alliance  of Free Democrats  x
Total  3  4
Commitment-building in  a  parliamentary democracy can  be  a  long  and  painstaking
process, because of multiple veto and proposal actors, and greater ease of access to the policy
process by interest groups.  Commitment-building  in Hungary was complicated by the existence
of three major proposal actors in the commitment-building stage: the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of Welfare, and the Pension Insurance Fund.  The distance between their proposals was
great (see Table 4).  Veto actors were also numerous, including the two ministries, the prime
minister and head of the Socialist Party, and the Alliance of Free Democrats, a partisan veto actor
whose votes would be needed to pass the reform in parliament.  With twice as many veto actors
as in Kazakhstan, and three times the number of proposal actors, Hungary would be expected to
have a less radical and slower reform.
Hungary's three major proposal actors put forward their own pension reform proposals in
1995-1996  (see Table 3).  The distance between them can be seen by looking at their opposing
positions on implementing a private, funded pillar.  Only the Ministry of Finance pushed for a
Jarge funded pillar, while the Ministry of Welfare and the Pension Insurance Fund advocated
rationalization of the state PAYG system (Nelson 1998). Opposition was intransigent, creating a
rather polarized debate.
Activities of the Finance Ministry working group for pension reform were funded by the
World Bank under its Japanese grant facility.  Ferge notes ihat "the better opportunities and
r  esources of the Ministry of Finance. . . had a dominant impact on the whole process" of reforn
(Ferge  1997,  11).  In particular,  Ferge points  to  Finance Ministry  dominance in  technical
Capacity,  personnel and in attracting media attention.  This attests to the power of direct World
]3ank interventions in developing country policy processes, where alternative proposal actors are
unlikely to have access to comparable resources.
While the  World Bank played a vital  role in  strengthening the  Finance Ministry  in
internal governmental debates, including a phase  in which the ministry advocated a  radical,
Chilean-style reform,  the  Bank  ultimately advocated a  moderate,  multi-pillar  model  with
substantial tailoring to Hungarian conditions.
The Finance Ministry initially proposed a reform plan as radical as that of Kazakhstan,
lbut  it was quickly moderated due to internal disagreement within the government.  The evolution
of  the Finance Ministry's  proposal for  fundamental reform is  instructive, as  it  shows how
:reformers  themselves may moderate reform proposals to anticipate opposition from alternative
veto and proposal actors.  Under the leadership of Adam Gere, an investment banker whose firm
had a large share of the business managing Hungary's voluntary third-pillar funds, the Finance
Ministry working group initially discussed a complete phase-out of Hungary's PAYG system
(interview with Gere, May 5, 1998). A Hungarian 6migre based in the United States, Gere took a
29technocratic, non-political approach to  reform and quickly became almost as controversial a
figure as Bokros himself.  However, other members of the working group opposed Gere's efforts
at fundamental reform on two  grounds: finance and political feasibility.  They  argued that
Hungary's high implicit pension debt would make it difficult to finance the transition and that it
would be politically unfeasible to eliminate the PAYG system.  A full transition to a Chilean-
type system was regarded as "un-European"  (cf. Palacios and Rocha 1998, 18) and unsaleable in
a country with a strong tradition of PAYG pension provision.
After extensive debate, the Finance Ministry proposed a pension system that would be
50% pay-as-you-go and 50% funded (Magyar Hirlap, January 29, 1996).  The proposal would
have reduced total  social  sector contributions from  54% to  44%,  with  25% earmarked for
pension insurance and 19% for health.  Within the 25% pension contribution, a 15% employer
contribution would be applied to a the first pillar and a 10% employee contribution to mandatory
private funds.  People aged 40  and under would be  obliged to join  the  new  system  (Napi
Gazdasag, December 2, 1995). Members of the working group who had initially been skeptical
of  fundamental reform, including the  chairman of the supervisory board  for the  third-pillar
pension system, supported it after it was decided that the organization of the second pillar funds
would mirror those of the third pillar, and would be placed under the same regulatory authority
(interview with Laszlo Urban, May 6, 1998).
30TABLE 3.  PENSION REFORM PROPOSALS IN HUNGARY, 1996
Ministry  of Finance  Pension  Insurance  Fund  Ministry  of Welfare
goals of the  reduce the role of the state;  1.  ensure pensions proportional to the  1.  provide the aged with income
relorm  Z.  make state guarantee partial,  IlunIIel-  of  surviure  ycisi  lN  1U  ainOiltUII  bV1%-ui;y,
3.  increase self-reliance;  of contributions paid;  2.  create system that is uniform,
4.  finance pension insurance without its  2.  wage indexation of benefits;  mandatory and rests on insurance
posing burden on the budget;  3.  create the conditions for long-term  principles.
5.  decrease employer contributions.  stable financing of the system;
4.  ensure the provision of pensions and
consolidation in the short-term.
Character-  1.  three-pillar system;  1.  labor pension system with two  1.  two-pillar pension system
istics of  2.  basic pension is PAYG, depends on  complementary pillars;  2.  PAYG Labor Pension: provision
model  income and service years, financed  2.  universal basic pension amounting to  proportional to contributions paid
exclusively from employers'  30% of the pensioners' income;  determined on insurance principles;
contribution;  3.  labor pension with less solidaristic  3.  contribution split evenly between the
3.  second funded pillar financed from  elements ensuring 60% of old-age  employers and employees;
employees' contribution;  income, determined based on lifetime  4.  57-58% replacement rate, no minimal
4.  means-tested normative state pension;  earnings using a point-system, its  pensions;
5.  voluntary funded third pillar  source is the employers' and  5.  voluntary pension funds as at present;
employees' equal contribution rates;  6.  complementary state social assistance
4.  voluntary pension funds providing
10% of pensioners' income
type of  1.  contribution base is the same as the  1.  earmarked income tax reserved to  1.  PAYG Labor Pension contribution
financing  personal income taxable wage;  finance the basic pension;  base is equivalent to the taxable wage
2.  employers' burden significantly  2.  labor pension: employer and  income between min. and max. limits;
decreases while employees'  employee contribution;  2.  pensions are gross, thus become
significantly increases;  3.  budget's full guarantee remains  taxable
3.  state budget expenditure increases as  unchanged;
a result of the means-tested pensions;  4.  leads to decreased contribution rates
4.  pension  system  expenditures  decrease
pacinig  oi  1.  systeLn sta.s  rnlediately  but  oly  1.  princies  of the  new  p  o  st  l  . new, system  can  start  i
reform  those under 40 have to  join;  to be worked out by June 1996 and
2.  maturation takes 20-25 years  summarized in a parliamentary decree
period of  1.  widen contribution base in order to  I.  uniform retirement age;  1.  make retirement age uniform, then
transition  consolidate system in the long-run;  2.  linear pension scale;  raise retirement age;
2.  introduce  minimum contribution base;  3.  continuation of valorization;  2.  restrict early retirement conditions;
3.  decrease employer contribution;  4.  determining upper and lower limit of  3.  point system to determine pensions;
4.  increase employee contribution;  contribution base  4.  do not count service years without
5.  increase retirement age to 65 by 2012;  5.  decrease employer and employee  contribution payment;
6.  price indexation of benefits  contribution rates  5.  keep individual records.
SOURCES: Magyar Ilirlap, " Secure Pensions, A Comparative Table of the Pension Reform Concepts of the MoF, MoW, and Pension Insurance Fund," April 5, 1996 and own observations.During 1995 and early 1996, two other proposal actors in Hungary developed pension
reform proposals, without the benefit of World Bank technical assistance, 2 and with  a more
conservative agenda.  The Ministry of Welfare developed a competing proposal, assisted by
German advisers.  The Pension Insurance Fund (PIF) supervisory board, an elected body made
up mainly of trade union representatives, developed a third proposal.  However, the PIF was
outside direct government control.  This meant that the PIF was not a veto actor, but also that the
government could not force the PIF to cease advocating its alternative plan, even as Hungary
moved into the coalition-building stage. Deliberation within the government over these three
proposals resulted in a deadlock that lasted through the beginning of 1996.
This deadlock was broken by a change in personnel at the Finance Ministry.  Bokros
resigned as Finance Minister in February 1996, leaving Gere's working group without its top
political sponsor.  While this could have weakened or changed the finance ministry's position,
the new Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy remained equally committed to  pension  reform.
However, he was more willing to compromise in order to reach agreement.
In early April 1996, the government committed itself to  developing a  unified pension
reform proposal  by  the  end  of the  month (Nepszabadsag, April  3,  1996).  Pressure  from
international organizations seems to have played an important role in setting this deadline. Prime
Minister Horn wanted credibility in the West for his Socialist Party, and Hungary had agreed
with the IMF to develop a pension reform program by December 31, 1996. Hungary's electoral
timetable also influenced this decision.  New elections were  scheduled in  May  1998.  The
government therefore wanted to implement reform in January 1998, which did not leave much
time.
Medgyessy invited representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Welfare to his office
on April 9, 1996 and told them they had to agree on the outlines of a joint program:  During the
meeting, Minister of Welfare Gyorgy Szabo accepted a partly-funded system, if a way could be
found to  finance it  (Magyar Hirlap, April  10, 1996; Budapest Business  Week, April  15-21,
1996). A compromise was reached, in which the Ministry of Finance program became the main
framework document, but the size of the second pillar was reduced from about one-half to one-
third of total contributions. The point-system for reforming the first pillar was taken from the
Ministry of Welfare program, along with a lower labor period to qualify for a first-pillar pension,
20 years, rather than the 32 or 35 proposed by the Ministry of Finance.  The basic pension would
be  financed  by  an  18% employer  contribution and the  second pillar  by  a  10%  employee
contribution (Magyar Hirlap, April 24, 1996). The reformed system would produce an estimated
average replacement rate of 55-60%.
One  proposal  actor,  the  Pension  Insurance  Fund  (PIF),  remained  outside  of  this
government compromise. Minister Szabo wanted to find a way to get the PIF to agree, at least in
principle, with the outlines of reform. However, this proved impossible.  Instead, with the main
veto/proposal actors agreed on the outlines of reform, the government decided to move ahead,
wanting to  implement reform before the end of the parliamentary term.  Multiple  veto and
proposal actors forced government reformers to compromise on their reform designs.  They also
caused delays, but ultimately an agreement was reached.  The Ministry of Finance, backed by
World Bank resources, emerged from the commitment-building process with the main lines of its
reform proposal intact, and a government commitment to establish a mandatory, funded pillar in
Hungary.
2 The Pension  Insurance  Fund did not have  World  Bank  support  to develop  pension  reform  proposals,  but it did
have  access  to another  World  Bank  technical  assistance  loan  (PAHIP)  that it may have  drawn  on to develop  and
promote  its proposal.
325.2.3  COALITION-BUILDING
Proposal actor  Veto actor
Wiorking  group  x  x
Prime Minister/Socialist Party  x
A.lliance  of Free Democrats  x
Trade Unions/IRC  x
Pension Insurance Fund  x
Total  2  4
The April 1996 reconciliation of the two government programs started a new phase in the
development of reform.  Coalition-building in Hungary was rnainly a process of working out
differences within the government coalition itself, which held '72% of seats in parliament.  The
two partisan veto actors were the Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats, a liberal
party that was favorably predisposed to fundamental reform.  The Socialist Party was divided.
EBecause  of these divisions, the voice of the Socialist-affiliated  trade unions (MSZOSZ) became
highly  influential.  Some Socialist parliamentarians refused to  vote for  fundamental reform
unless it was first approved by the Interest Reconciliation Council (IRC), in which the Socialist
t-ade unions had a decisive voice.  This shifted deliberation from the parliament to  the IRC.
Discussions in the IRC took longer, and produced more compromises, than those in parliament.
Negotiations in the coalition-building stage in Hungary causecl some watering-down of reform
proposals, among other things reducing the contribution rate to the second pillar from 10% to 6-
8%.  This reflected divisions among the four main veto actors, and the presence of an alternative
proposal  actor,  still  advocating rationalization of  the  existing  PAYG  system,  rather  than
fundamental reform.
During the coalition-building stage, the main proposal actor was the  interministerial
working group for pension reform, where government reform proposals were elaborated and
legislation drafted. The World Bank was heavily involved in funding and assisting the new
i-nterministerial  working  group.  Several World Bank  representatives participated in  the  30-
rmember  working group as observers, and provided much of its technical capacity.  However,
rmembership  of the working group was cast fairly widely.  Experts from the Ministry of Welfare
were included, helping to prepare changes in the first pillar. A prominent investment banker,
Csaba Lantos, was chosen to  head the 'investment team'  charged with  drawing up portfolio
rmanagement rules  and principles  related to  the introductiorn  of  the  funded pension  system
(Pension Team, 30 May 1996).
Handling opposition from the alternative proposal actor. the Pension Insurance Fund, was
a key concern of the government. In July 1996, Minister of 'Welfare Gyorgy Szabo and State
'Secretary  Tibor Draskovics of the Ministry of Finance wrote that the PIF had to be involved in
the reform process, in order to help with necessary data collection and eventual implementation
(Ministry of Welfare, July 1996). However, the government working group continued its work
without participation from PIF experts. The distance between the two proposals was too great to
Edlow  for meaningful collaboration. Interestingly, the PI]F  also had access to a World Bank loan
that had been processed earlier and used the technical assistance component of this loan to
conduct its own reform agenda.
World Bank assistance to the working group intensified, allowing the employment of
numerous foreign experts. By December 1996,  the working group had created models of the new
33pension system, with  flexible parameters and a highly detailed legislative proposal, consulted
with  a  variety  of  national  and  international legal  experts.  Moreover,  the  working  group
dominated expert debate  within the  country, with  cohesive argumentation  in  a  number  of
important expert and public fora (interview with Roberto Rocha, May 6, 1998).
A  special  parliamentary group  became the main  forum  for  ironing  out  differences
between  the  two  partisan veto  actors.  The  Coalition Parties' Working  Group on  General
Government Reform was founded by reformers from the Hungarian Socialist Party  and the
Alliance of Free Democrats towards the end of the Bokros period, and dedicated to pushing a
liberal reform agenda.  Powerful centrist members of the Hungarian Socialist Party also joined
the  group,  including  Sandor Nagy  and  Judit  Csehak,  key  figures  in  social  policymaking
(interview with Klara Ungar, August 1998).  The coalition parties' working group had initially
been undecided about fundamental reform. In early April, it began to lean towards supporting the
Ministry of Finance proposal (Nepszabadsag, April 3, 1996).
On April 23, 1996, after the forced reconciliation of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry
of Welfare proposals, the  Coalition Parties Working Group on General Government Reform
formally considered the joint proposal of the government, and after extensive discussions, lent its
full support to the program.  These deliberations proved crucial, since several parliamentarians
with important roles in  social policy committees had to be  convinced of the wisdom  of the
government plan.  One key player who came over to the government side was Judit Csehak, chair
of the social policy committee in parliarnent, and a former welfare minister under communist
rule.  She would play a critical role in forging compromises she judged acceptable to parliament,
and later in selling the program to a wider audience.  It should be noted that Csehak, like other
major players in the pension reform debate in Hungary, was also involved in setting up third-
pillar voluntary mutual benefit societies, and thus had business interests in the sector.  Csehak
reportedly fought for higher annuity rates in the second pillar and more guarantees, especially of
a minimum annuity from the second pillar.  She had strong views on the role of fund managers
and was conscious of public acceptability of the program (interview with Tibor Parniczky, May
7, 1998).  The coalition parties' working group replaced, to a certain extent, deliberation within
parliament itself, creating a level of agreement among coalition parliamentarians that obviated
the need for extensive deliberation later on.
Parliament also held several debates that allowed room  for broader public discussion
outside the  main partisan veto actors.  The first  was on May  8,  1996, the  day  before the
government approved the joint  concept of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Welfare.
Parliament considered a draft of the government's proposal in July and held another debate day
on October 13, 1996, called for by the Hungarian Democratic Peoples' Party  (MDNP).  This
enabled parties to  repeat their  already clear positions  on pension  reform program (Magyar
Hirlap, October  14,  1996).  But by this  time,  a  critical mass  of coalition  parliamentarians
supported the reform (interview with Roberto Rocha, May 6, 1998).
Interestingly, the leading right opposition party, the Young Democrats (FIDESZ), was
split over the government's pension reform program. While some deputies spoke out against the
reform, others stayed quiet during the pension reform process.  These reformers did not want to
urge more radical changes, such as a further increases in the pension age, which they feared
would be unpopular.  On the other hand, they did not want to object to the fundamental precepts
of the program, for fear of wrecking a reform which some within FIDESZ saw as desirable
(interview with Laszlo Urban, May 6, 1998). The position of the main opposition party became
important during the  implementation phase as FIDESZ, after winning the  1998 elections in
Hungary, enacted several important modifications to the reformed pension system.  Had this
potential veto actor been possible to include earlier in the reform process, it might have limited
the scope of post-hoc adjustments.
34Once the working group had finished its legislative drafting and modeling, winning the
support of the key partisan veto actors, it set out at the beginring of 1997 to engage in a broad
public discussion intended to rally diffuse support for reform and bring skeptical interest groups
on board.  A public relations campaign was launched and an intensive series of meetings was
organized with different interest groups and top officials from the working group.  Minister of
F'inance Peter Medgyessy was prominent in many meetings, along with working group leaders
Istvan Gyorffy and Maria Major.  World Bank advisers chose to not take an active role in public
discourse, to avoid the perception that the reform was foisted upon Hungary by the World Bank
(interview with Roberto Rocha, May 6, 1998).  This partial list of meetings between working
group members and  various  social groups, compiled from  Ministry of  Finance  documents,
indicates where the government saw potential interest group opposition and significant actors in
the debate:
Meetings  on Pension  Reform,  1997
January  6: Coalition parties
January 7: Pension Insurance Fund
January 8: Parliamentary representatives
January 14: National Alliance of Pensioners
January 15: Council of the Elderly
January 21: Child and Youth Interest Reconciliation Council
January 22: Board of Directors of SZEF state and municipal employees' trade union
January 29: Board of Directors of MSZOSZ trade union
January 30: Hungarian Socialist Party members of parliament
F'ebruary  4: Interest Reconciliation Council
F'ebruary 7: Interest Reconciliation Council
f'ebruary 13: Conference organized by Sandor Nagy (former  head of MSZOSZ and PIF)
f'ebruary 17: Hungarian Democratic Peoples' Party (MDNP)
February 19: Hungarian Socialist Party Left Group
F'ebruary  21: Board of Directors of SZEF trade union
February 26: MSZOSZ Council of Alliance leaders (including PIF President Janos Vago)
February 28: Interest Reconciliation Council
March (various dates): Hungarian Socialist Party MPs
Hungarian Socialist Party Board of Directors
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) MPs
March 11: Pension Insurance Fund
MAarch  12: Interest Reconciliation Council
The most  powerful interest group was the Socialist-affiliated trade union  federation,
TMSZOSZ,  which was represented both in the Pension Insurance Fund board  and within the
Socialist party parliamentary group itself. However, the socialist trade unions also had their own
independent base of support, and a credible strike threat.  MS2,OSZ  also dominated the Pension
Insurance Fund board, and thus had a significant stake in the pre-reform system.  The main
f'orum for reaching an agreement with the trade unions was "Hungary's  Interest Reconciliation
Council (IRC), a tripartite  body bringing together representatives of  government, labor, and
business for regular meetings on economic  and social policy issues.
In the first of a series of IRC meetings on February 4, 1997, the government proposal met
vith  fierce  resistance  from  the  MSZOSZ  trade  union  leadership.  Some  trade  union
representatives supported the Pension Insurance Fund plan for a reformed PAYG system, and at
the start of negotiations, MSZOSZ trade union leader Laszlco  Sandor expressed opposition to
channeling one-third of  payroll tax  contributions to  a, mandatory  funded pillar.  Employer
representatives questioned the mandatory funded pillar as well, on the basis of transition finance.
Finance Minister Medgyessy tried to counter these arguments by focusing on the time pressure
reformers were under, arguing that pension reform had to happen in 1998, before the upcoming
elections (Nepszabadsag, February 5, 1997).
35A key sticking point was the half-price, half-wage pension indexation (called "Swiss"
indexation) of pensions proposed in the government bill.  Other issues included whether to adopt
the first-pillar point system proposed by  the PIF,  whether years  spent raising  children and
studying at universities should count as service years, and the benefit formula used in the first
pillar (Vilaggazdasag, February 10, 1997). The two sides were so far apart that MSZOSZ leader
Laszlo  Sandor announced that he  would lead the workers out  on  strike if  the  government
submitted its original proposal to parliament (Napi Gazdasag, February 8, 1997).
However,  a  number  of  significant  compromises  were  reached  in  the  Interest
Reconciliation Council.  The government agreed to a more generous benefit formula for the first
pillar, to create a state guarantee for the second pillar funds, and to allow people the option of
paying into the private pillar during years spent in child-raising or studying at universities, and to
count these  as  service years  that  qualify  for minimum  benefits.  The transition  to  Swiss
indexation was delayed until 2000, and in the meantime the government agreed to several above-
inflation adjustments to pension rates (Magyar Hirlap, February 13, 1997).
Further compromises were made at a conference on February 13 organized by Sandor
Nagy, a former head of both MSZOSZ and the Pension Insurance Fund.  Nagy criticized the
government for not paying more attention to the PIF proposal, and yet worked out a deal that
would allow multi-pillar reform to go ahead.  While the government had been proposing a 10%
contribution to the mandatory private pillar, and trade unions wanted 3%, a compromise was
reached whereby the initial  contribution rate would be  6%, phased  up  to  8% in two  years
(interview  with  Klara  Ungar,  August  1998; interview with  Roberto Rocha,  May  6,  1998,
interview with Mihaly Kokeny, August 1998).  Other compromises reached in February  1997
IRC meetings included increased state guarantees for the second pillar, changes in the rates for
crediting years worked under the mixed system, additional maternity years  counted towards
pension eligibility, and a two-year waiting period before special occupation groups' retirement
conditions were  re-regulated (Ministry of Finance documents, February-March 1997).  Thus
trade  unions  had  a  moderate, but  significant impact  on  reform.  Their  effectiveness was
determined by their strong links with Socialist Party leaders like Nagy, and their presence within
the both Socialist Party parliamentary group and the PIF.
Palacios and Rocha estimated the value of the most important compromises made during
this  period  of public  dialogue  (1998, 31), including the  delay in  implementation  of  Swiss
indexation and an increase in survivors' benefits. They found that these two changes alone would
cost between 0.5 to  1.0% of GDP during the first decade or so of transition, making the total
savings in implicit pension debt 15% less than previously.  However, Palacios and Rocha also
found that the impact of these changes would diminish substantially over the long run.  They
concluded that "the political compromises focused on the very short term and that the discount
rate for political calculations was high."  This suggests the broad feasibility of making acceptable
short-term political deals in order to lock in fundamental  reform over the long term.
Despite these agreements in February, resistance from the Pension Insurance Fund and
the  trade  unions  continued  until the  end  of April  1997, when pressure  for  an  agreement
intensified as the government prepared to submit its proposal to parliament at the beginning of
May. The Interest Reconciliation Council (IRC) reached a final agreement in its last scheduled
session (Magyar Hirlap, April 30, 1997).  This reflected two additional compromises, one that
postponed reform of  the disability pension system (interview with  Mihaly Kokeny, August
1998), and a second that should have perpetuated Socialist-affiliated trade union dominance of
the Pension Insurance Fund by delegating seats according to a pre-set formula that favored the
MSZOSZ.  In addition, the PIF was promised that it could found its own second-pillar fund
(interview with Gabor Futo, August 25, 1998) and some suggest that the leader of the MSZOSZ
trade union, Laszlo Sandor, was promised a prominent place on the Socialist Party's electoral list
36and appointment as Minister of Labor after the 1998 elections (interview with Laszlo Keller,
August25,  1998).
Parliament had made IRC approval a precondition for passing the program into law, and
when the social partners were satisfied, parliament moved swiftly.  On May 12, almost exactly a
year after the first parliamentary debate day, the government submitted its pension reform plan
(Nepszabadsag, May  13,  1997).  It  consisted of  five  laws  and  two  parliamentary decree
proposals.  The government pushed for the package to be voted on immediately by parliament,
after two weeks of study, but the opposition refused.  Deputies complained that the laws were
drafted in a very opaque fashion, and working group head Istvan Gyorffy agreed, but blamed it
on the PIF (Nepszabadsag, May 23, 1997). Parliamentary debaie began on June 3 and continued
until July 15, with the opposition voicing doubts over financing the transitional pension deficit,
and  whether  private  pension  funds  would  really  bring  inuch  benefit  to  the  economy
(Nepszabadsag, June 11 & July 16, 1997).  The five laws were passed on July 15, 1997, with
support from 55-58% of deputies (Ferge 1997, 13).
A number of observers have criticized the closed and elite nature of the policy process in
Hungary that led up to the acceptance of pension reform legislat:ion  in July 1997 (cf. Ferge 1997,
13). There is no question that the process was mainly one that took place within the government
coalition, with some consultation with interest groups connected with the Socialist Party.  World
Bank  and  other experts played  a  leading role as  consultants to  the  working  group,  while
discussions in the Interest Reconciliation Council produced only a moderate level of compromise
on the parameters of reform.  Public discussion was taken into account only towards the end of
the process, during a time when the government's priority was to 'sell' the reform through a
concurrent public relations campaign. Yet, the main partisan veto actors themselves contained a
flirly wide range of interest groups.  Coalition debate was fairly open, and allowed for a wide
ramge  of expert views to be expressed.  Opponents of the original Ministry of Finance proposal
vwithin  the government coalition had to be won over, and eventually a wide cross-section of
experts were included in the inter-ministerial working group.  Opinions of the Pension Insurance
Fund were not accepted in whole, but some compromises with it were reached.  The PIF could
have rallied support in parliament, but it did not.  In sum, while pension reform in Hungary was
indeed an expert or elite process, it was also a relatively open and democratic one of deliberation
wvithin  a super-majority government coalition.  Hungariims are now voting with their feet and
choosing to participate in the new, mixed system.  Whatever the valid criticisms, the policy
process in Hungary has produced a reform that has gainecd  the confidence of a wide cross-section
of the population, which is one measure of substantive democratic results.
Hungary's reformed pension system started operations on January 1, 1998.  Since then,
new labor force entrants have been required to participate in the new, mixed system.  Other
wvorkers  were given a choice whether to switch. However, guarantees within the new system are
provided only for those with 15 years of contribution at retirement, which encourages workers
over the age of 47 not to join (Palacios and Rocha 1998, 21).  In addition to implementing a
rmandatory,  funded pillar, the reform also significantly altered the PAYG first pillar, phasing in a
higher retirement age of 62 for both men and women by 2009, Swiss indexation (a 50-50 price-
wage mix) of benefits by 2001, and a new benefit formula and tax regime by 2013 (Palacios and
Rocha 1998, 22).  The first pillar remains PAYG, funded by a payroll tax of 30% of gross wages
for those remaining in the old system, or 22% for those joining the mixed system.
5.2.4  IMPLEMENTATION
One striking feature of the Hungarian reform is the extent of changes it underwent in the
early implementation phase, due to a new partisan veto actor entering the process.  When the
37center-right party, FIDESZ, unexpectedly won elections in May 1998 and formed a government,
it shelved plans to increase the contribution rate to the second pillar from 6% to 8% over a two-
year period, as agreed in the Interest Reconciliation Council (IRC).  It also eliminated the quasi-
independent Pension  Insurance Fund,  bringing pension  system  administration  under  direct
government control and destroying an important power base of the leftist trade unions.  The new
government  further  eliminated the  Ministry  of  Labor and  refused  to  implement  generous
percentage increases in pension benefit levels agreed with the trade unions in the IRC.  While
reform was not completely reversed, the FIDESZ government significantly reduced the size of
the private, funded pillar, angered private pension fund companies, and destabilized some of the
political compromises that had made pension reform possible in the first place (interview with
Sandor Nagy, August 1998).
These changes demonstrate the power that new actors may have when they rise to power
in  the implementation phase.  They also underline some of the tradeoffs that  reformers face
across phases of reform and deliberative fora.  Excluding FIDESZ from deliberation in the early
stages of reform simplified commitment- and coalition-building. Since the government had 72%
of seats in parliament, there was no need to negotiate with partisan actors and interest groups
outside the government coalition.  Using the coalition parties' working group as a deliberative
forum, rather than a regular parliamentary committee, also simplified the process, but at the cost
of  alienating potential  supporters from  opposition parties.  When  excluded partisan  actors
suddenly rose to  power, they  substantially revised the new system.  Still,  despite moderate
reversals, Hungary became the first country in postcommunist Central Europe to  implement
fundamental pension reform.
5.2.5  CONCLUSIONS
As predicted in the first hypothesis, Hungary shows that policy legacies do have a major
impact on pension reform design.  Hungary's high implicit pension debt played a role in limiting
the relative size of the private pillar to about one-quarter of total contributions.  Similarly, the
policy  legacies of  third-pillar  reform  in  1993  influenced the  shape  of  the  second  pillar.
Representatives of the third pillar funds and regulatory agency, including key members of the
Hungarian Socialist Party, lobbied successfully to make the design of the second pillar match
that of the third, and to extend the powers of the third-pillar agency to regulate it.
As expressed in the second hypothesis, the involvement of multiple veto and proposal
actors also had a powerful influence on reform.  The need to compromise among veto actors
within the government about the basic design of reform clearly limited the degree of change,
reducing the size of the private pillar.  Negotiations between the government and trade union
interest groups resulted in a further reduction in the size of the private pillar.  Hungary's Pension
Insurance Fund shows that proposal actors, even when they do not  exercise veto power, can
influence outcomes of reform.  Pension Insurance Fund opposition to a funded pillar bolstered
the position of anti-reform trade unionists and increased the cost of compromise in the Interest
Reconciliation Council.  This also provides evidence for hypothesis three, that the impact of
interest groups is linked to their associations with major veto and proposal actors.  Through their
close association with both major proposal actors, trade unions were able to substantially reduce
the size of the new private pillar and gain other concessions, while groups not affiliated with key
veto or proposal actors were excluded from the policy process.
The fourth hypothesis suggested that direct World Bank intervention and ideas would
have a major influence on the extent of policy change.  While the World Bank did contribute
greatly to reform in Hungary, it is notable that while the Bank was involved earlier and more
heavily in Hungary than in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan that produced a reform with a larger private
38pillar.  Greater World Bank technical assistance does not prodtuce  a larger private, funded pillar.
Two factors seem to  explain this.  First, the World Bank does not always advocate a larger
funded pillar and gives a variety of options within the multipillar system. While Averting the Old
Age Crisis was an influential work, disagreements persist within the World Bank on the best type
of pension reform for a given country, and Averting itself offers a range of possible solutions.
There is also widespread support within the World Bank for solutions such as "notional  defined
contribution"  systems (discussed below) that are not advocated in Averting.  What advice the
'World Bank gives depends a great deal on the actual consultants employed in a given country,
their ideas, experiences, and predispositions (Deacon 1997). Second, the World Bank is not the
only  source of  pension reform ideas.  In the case of Kazakhstan, USAID was particularly
influential, and pushed for a more radical variant of reform than some World Bank officials
rnight have prefered.  This suggests that World Bank influence depends on its relations to key
veto and proposal actors.  When it gives advice to a single, dominant proposal actor, the World
Bank can be extraordinarily effective.  However, when rnultiple proposal actors are involved in
the policy process, the World Bank can only advocate its, position in government fora, support a
chosen proposal actor through technical assistance, and accept final outcomes of reform that
(lepend on domestic political processes.  One clear commonality is that the World Bank will
generally support reforms that have some funded component, but  this may come in  a  wide
variety of forms. However, even this general commitment  to privatization is not monolithic. The
Bank also supports pension reforns  that have no private, funded component (for instance in
Moldova, see Cashu 1999), under certain circumstances  and local conditions.
Two final hypotheses concern tradeoffs across (lelibeiative fora and phases of reform.
I-ow did these play out  in Hungary?  Tradeoffs across deliberative fora were evident in the
intense negotiation of reforms in Hungary's Interest Reconciliation Council and special coalition
parties' working group, rather than in parliament.  Negotiations in these two fora significantly
reduced the need for extensive deliberation in parliament, since the major veto and proposal
actors and interest groups had already been consulted.
Tradeoffs across policy stages are also visible in the 1-lungarian  case.  Hungary moved
ahead with reform in April 1996 by forcing reconciliaticin  between two governmental proposals
f:or reform, but leaving the Pension Insurance Fund (PIF) out.. This involved a tradeoff across
phases.  Exclusion of the PIF at the commitment-building  phase increased the speed and radical
nature of reform design.  However, it also appears to have increased the costs of compromise at
the coalition-building phase.  The presence of an alternative, non-governmental proposal actor
lent weight to trade union opposition to reform.  In another tradeoff in the coalition-building
phase,  reformers  decided  to  rely  solely  on  the  government  coalition's  super-majority in
parliament to pass reform, without support from opposition parties.  This speeded reform and
avoided potential compromises, but had costs in impleraentation.  For when opposition parties
took power after elections in May 1998, they reduced the sizc of the private pillar and revoked
some of  the  compromises that  had been made  by the  government in  the  IRC.  Including
opposition parties  in  coaltion-building may have watered down reform, but  also may  have
avoided post-hoc reductions in the private pillar during irnplementation.
In the next section, we will see that Poland provides a striking example of reform being
naegotiated  across political boundaries of government ancL  opposition, enhancing the durability of
:?olitical  compromises reached on the design of reform.
395.3  POLAND
5.3.1  POLICY  LEGACIES
In  the  mid-1990s,  Poland's  pension  system  suffered  from  transition  policies  that
drastically expanded eligibility for early retirement and disability pensions, causing a rapid rise
in  the  system  dependency ratio.  As  opposed to  most  postcommunist  countries,  average
replacement rates (as a percentage of pre-retirement income) also increased, from about 60% to
about 75% between 1990 and 1993 (Andrews and Rashid 1996, 9).  Both of these trends caused
pension spending to skyrocket.  Pension spending in Poland ranked among the highest of any
postcommunist transition  country in  1993, despite Poland's relatively favorable demographic
situation (Andrews and Rashid  1996).  Poland also inherited a widespread system of special
pension privileges, a history of ad hoc changes in indexation rates, and an emerging demographic
problem.  Poland's implicit pension debt was 220% of GDP at the outset of reform (James
1998b), while payroll tax contribution rates for all forms of social insurance reached 45%.  The
pay-as-you-go state pension  system was managed by a special pension insurance institution,
ZUS.  A special  farmers' pension  system, KRUS, was heavily indebted  and kept  afloat by
government subsidies.
As  early as  1991, ZUS president Wojciech Topinski and Marian Wisniewski (1991)
proposed a partially-funded pension system for Poland.  However, while this  proposal had a
strong impact in some expert circles, it was never debated as a government programn. Pension
reform was perceived by politicians as an issue that was too controversial to tackle, and there was
little agreement on the substance of reform.
Instead, as pension spending increased from 8.6% to  15.5% of GDP between 1990 and
1994, Polish  governments used  ad  hoc  measures to  control  spending by  changing  benefit
formulae, indexation levels and rules on additional allowances. Poland's Constitutional Tribunal
put an end to these practices by issuing decisions that declared ad hoc changes illegal and forced
the government to repay any lost benefits.  Only then did government officials take the pension
crisis  seriously, and  begin  to  work toward  comprehensive reform.  (Chlon  et  al.  1999,  12;
Hausner 1998, 14).
5.3.2  COMMITMENT-BUILDING
Proposal  actor  Veto actor
Ministry  of Finance  x  x
Ministry  of Labor  and Social  Affairs  x  x
Prime  Minister/Democratic  Left Alliance  x
Polish  Peasant  Party  x
Solidarity  Trade  Union  x
Institute  of Labor  and Social  Affairs  x
Total  4  4
When Poland began to consider fundamental reform in 1994, four distinct proposals were
elaborated.  The proposals'of  the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Welfare were by far the
40raost important; however, it is notable in Poland that two civil society actors formulated their
own proposals.  A proposal by the Solidarity trade union was seriously debated, while a proposal
7by  and the Institute of Labor and Social Policy had a rninimal impact.  Still, the presence of
alternative civil society proposal actors sets Poland apart from Kazakhstan and even Hungary,
indicating a higher level of public involvement in the pension reform process.
However, the main forum of the pension reform debate remained the government, and the
central feature of the commitment-building stage in Poland was a year-and-a-half long standoff
(late 1994 to mid-1996) between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs over opposing proposals for reform (Chlon et al. 1999, 12).  While Finance Minister
Grzegorz W. Kolodko made a general proposal for fundamental reform of the pension system in
his  June 1994 "Strategy for Poland," Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Leszek Miller wanted
to rationalize the existing system.  This polarization of reform proposals within the government
set the stage for a  long debate.  Since Miller was an important figure within the governing
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), while Kolodko was an independent economic expert,
MIiller  initially had upper hand within the government.  The government initially approved the
TMinistry  of Labor's proposals for rationalization in May 1995, which provided for:
*  establishing a basic pension of 30% of average wage for everyone;
*  an additional insurance-based pension for all those who had contributed to the system
more than 15 years, proportional to an individual's earnings and work period;
- supplementary  pensions based on voluntary contributions;
D  equalizing indexation rules for the uniformed services;
*  limiting and partially eliminating branch privileges;
*  gradually increasing the contribution rate to the farmers' pension system;
*  capping contribution rates at 250% of average wage;
*  splitting contributions equally between employees and employers;
*  introducing more restrictive rules for disability qualification;
*  gradually increasing the retirement age to 65 for both men and women.
The Ministry of Finance strongly opposed the Ministry of Labor's program as being too
conservative and quickly formulated an alternative proposal ;For  a Chilean-type reform. It was
conceived by Marek Mazur, an advisor to Minister Kolodko.  Mazur made a study trip to Latin
America and supported a dominant funded pillar.  Extensive public opinion research also showed
that Poles found the Ministry of Labor's proposal too timid and wanted more radical reform.  In
the autumn of  1995, the government changed course and recommended the preparation of a
version of pension reform program that would give a greater role to a funded pillar  (Hausner
1998, 15-16).  Now  on the defensive, the Ministry of Labor played a blocking role and the
,reform  process remained at a standstill.
In January 1996, the Institute of Labor and Social Affairs convened an expert conference
to discuss and reconcile the competing governmental and non-governmental proposals.  The
main principles  of each  concept are presented in  Table 4, with  the Ministry  of  Labor and
Ministry  of  Finance  proposals  on  the  two  extremes,  and  the  ones  formulated  by  non-
governmental organizations situated between these two. The conference ended with a recognition
that each of the programs had its flaws, and that a new approach was needed.
An end to the stalemate finally came in February 1996. As a result of a cabinet reshuffle,
and the appointment of a new Prime Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Labor Minister Miller
was transferred  to  the  Interior  Ministry,  while Andrzej Baczkowski  was  appointed  Labor
41Minister in his place.  Both the new Prime Minister and Labor Minister supported fundamental
reform. Baczkowski also had been a Solidarity activist, and thus provided a link between the left
government and the main opposition proposal actor, the Solidarity trade union.  Baczkowski had
demonstrated unusual negotiating skills and had been appointed chairman of the new tripartite
commission for socio-economic affairs in 1994.
Baczkowski proposed creating a special office for pension reform, called the Office of the
Plenipotentiary  for  Social  Security  Reform, that  would  improve  coordination  within  the
government,  render  pension  reform independent of  any  ministry,  allow  non-governmental
experts to be  involved in  the drafting, and indicate government commitment to  fundamental
reform (Chlon et al. 1999, 13).  Baczkowski was appointed Plenipotentiary as well as Labor
Minister, taking overall political responsibility for the reform.  The World Bank was asked to
assist in the creation and funding of the office of the plenipotentiary, which it did.  A Polish
World Bank official, Michal Rutkowski, was appointed head of the office of the plenipotentiary,
taking responsibility for the  day-to-day running of its  activities, and the  drafting of  reform
proposals.
Establishment of the Plenipotentiary and the Office of the Plenipotentiary marked a major
breakthrough in the pension reform effort in Poland.  The appointment of a pro-reform prime
minister, the reassignment of Minister Miller and the creation of a single governmental office for
pension reform reduced the number of  veto actors within the  government, indicated  strong
commitment to reform, and allowed the process of technical drafting to move swiftly ahead.  The
numerous  proposal  and  veto  actors  involved, and  the  long  delay  in  reaching  government
commitment to fundamental reform meant that Polish reformers had to race against the electoral
clock, with parliamentary elections scheduled for September 1997.  Unanticipated events and
further government shake-ups meant that Poland could not pass the whole legislative package for
pension reform in one parliamentary cycle.  Poland's coalition-building process therefore was
divided into two distinct phases.
5.3.3  COALITION-BUILDING:  PHASE  ONE
Proposal  actor  Veto actor
Office  of the Plenipotentiary  x  x
Prime  Minister/Democratic  Left Alliance  x
Parliament  x
Solidarity  trade union  x
Total  2  3
Poland is the only country in our sample in which pension reform was passed by two
successive governments and parliaments, representing most major parties at one time or another.
The first phase of coalition-building lasted from April 1996 to August 1997, and resulted in the
passage of three pieces of legislation that regulated the organization of the new second and third
pillars, and the use of privatization revenues to finance the transition.  The second phase lasted
from September 1997 to December 1998, under a new center-right government, which approved
laws overhauling the first pillar and withdrawing special pension privileges.  Support of partisan
actors across the political  spectrum is particular to Poland, and the manner in which  it was
achieved is instructive for other democratic countries contemplating reform.
42Work on the new pension program, Security through Diversity, began in September 1996
and was completed in February 1997, three months after the shocking, sudden death of Andrzej
EBaczkowski  in November 1996.  The loss of Baczkowski's great personal force endangered the
progress of  reform.  Baczkowski's  successor at the Labor Ministry, Tadeusz Zielinski, was
skeptical of fundamental reform.  However, the OP persevered with continued prime ministerial
support.  The government  appointed Jerzy  Hausner, a  former adviser to  Finance  Minister
Kolodko, Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform and moved the whole OP structure to the
Council of Ministers, where Hausner was Secretary of State.
During legislative drafting, the OP engaged in deliberation within the government on a
wide spectrum of issues (see Hausner 1998, 21-23).  The Ministry of Finance was involved in
discussing methods of financing the transition to a funded system and the use of privatization
revenues.  The State  Treasury was  consulted on  privatization-related issues. In  contrast to
HIungary,  Poland's  Social Insurance Institution (ZUS), the institution that manages the pension
system, did not oppose a multi-pillar reform. This was partly attributable to institutional reasons,
and partly to its leadership politics.  Reform plans in Poland gave ZUS a substantial, new role as
clearinghouse for  all  pension  payments, administrator of  the  pay-as-you-go pillar,  and the
manager of a new system of individual insurance record.s (Hausner 1998, 22). Therefore, ZUS
was not as threatened institutionally by reform plans in Poland as the Pension Insurance Fund
was  in  Hungary.  The ZUS  President was  also  a  political  appointee, whereas  the  Pension
Insurance Fund in  Hungary was an  independently-elected body with  substantial trade union
representation and intransigeant leadership. Since it more or less went along with reform, ZUS It
was consulted on administrative matters, although it also did not prepare sufficiently for a reform
that would transform its own work significantly.
43TABLE 4. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PENSION REFORM DISCUSSION IN POLAND PRIOR  TO FORMULATING  THE FINAL REFORM  PROPOSAL
Reform proposals tormulated between autumn 1995 and spring 1996
Ministry ot Finance  Solidarity  Institute of Labor and Social  Ministry ot Labor
Affairs
Basic pension - Flat pension on the level of  Baiension  cosisting  Benefit dependent on the  T3eneeit  based on the length of
first pillar  20% of average wage  two element - constant  length of contributing and  working career and
element financed from taxes  size of contribution.  individual's  salary, financed
and insurance element  Contribution is financed by  from contributions and state
financed from contribution  employee and employer with  subsidies with a cap of 250%
(individually determined)  cap on contributions and  of average wage (going down
pensions (gradually going to  to 200% of average wage)
the level of average wage)
Additional  Mandatory saving in pension  Mandatory saving in pension  Voluntary savings in pension  Voluntary savings in pension
pension - second  funds.  funds via shifting a part of  funds by people earning more  funds for people with highest
pillar  social security contribution  than average salary.  income. Expected
plus privatization bonds,  Additional system integrated  participation - marginal
given to all employees.  with basic one and combined
with tax preferences.
'l'ransition  path  Mandatory participation tor  Expected transition period  tor  Change in the tirst pillar at  Beginning ot' the legislation
the new entrants, a choice  forming pension funds (c.a.  the start of the process. Lower  process by the end of 90s,
between systems for  10 years), social security  replacement rate in the  implementation in the first
employed, very high  contribution divided between  pension system introduced  decade of the next century.
transition costs  PAYG and funded pillars,  when first pensioners buy  No proposals towards
significant subsidies from the  pensions in the second pillar.  reduction of the costs of the
state budget  Transition costs covered by  basic system.
lower expenditures from the
first pillar
Source: (iospodarka i Przyszlosc, special edition on Social Security.The  Office  of  the  Plenipotentiary's Security  through Diversity  program  was  tacitly
approved by the government in March-April 1997 as an amendment to its previously introduced
plans.  According to the program, the new pension systemr  would be multi-pillar, with a large, but
reformed, PAYG pillar, a new private pillar funded by approximately one-third of the old-age
payroll contribution, and a reformed, voluntary, third pillar.  T he transformed first pillar would
be based on a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) sysliem. While remaining PAYG, an NDC
system translates individual contributions into "notional capital" that is placed "on deposit" in
individual accounts.  These accounts accrue "interest" at a set rate, and pay  benefits that are
closely linked to individual contributions. However, the money is not really on deposit, and the
N4DC  is not really a funded system, as current contribuLtions  are used to pay current benefits.
NDC does, however, achieve many of the objectives of  a funded system, including making
benefits  transparent,  linking  them  tightly  to  contributions,  and  introducing  individual
responsibility. Security through Diversity proposed a mandatory, private, funded second pillar,
based on real  defined contributions.  It  also called for a  comprehensive reform of Poland's
voluntary pension savings.  For political reasons, as in other re-,forms,  people above the age of 50
would not participate in the new system. Younger workers, below 30 years of age, would be
required to join the second pillar, while those between 30 and 50 would have a right to chose
whether to switch to the multi-pillar system or be covered only by NDC first pillar.
Security through Diversity won general support from Poland's Tripartite Commission in
April 1997, including representatives of business associations and trade unions.  Why did trade
unions support fundamental reform in Poland, when they opposed it in Hungary?  The answer
lias to do with the content of the Solidarity trade union's own proposal for reform, that was not
too distant from the government proposal itself, and also called for the establishment of a private,
funded pillar.  However, the former communist trade uniion  federation also supported a private
pillar, while defending the primacy of the PAYG system. Although neither of these trade unions
'were formal veto actors, their voices were critical to attaining the high degree of parliamentary
and public support garnered both on the government  and opposition sides.
In order to move ahead with reform before elections in September 1997, the government
decided to focus on passing the least controversial elements of reform, meanwhile tying Poland
to a timeline that would force the next govermment  to pass reform by the middle of 1998, and to
s3tart  implementation in  1999.  Between June and August 1997, the first set of implementing
legislation was passed, on regulating and organizing the second and third pillars, and on the use
of privatization revenues to  finance the transition.  Ihe  second-pillar law provided for  the
establishment of a pension fund regulatory agency (UNFE) in May 1998, a licensing process for
private pension funds to start in August 1998, and pension funds to begin operations in January
1999.  This created powerful constituencies that would force the next government to complete
reform legislation.  ZUS also awarded an expensive contract to a Polish company, Prokom, to
develop a computer system to manage the new pension system. This reform legislation passed in
parliament with support from 90 percent of deputies, and across the political spectrum (Hausner
1998, 31).  Only a few right-wing deputies connected with the Christian national wing of the
Solidarity movement voted against fundamental reform.  Otherwise, all the major current and
potential partisan veto actors supported reform.  This proved important when the  center-left
coalition was overturned after elections in September 1997 by a new center-right coalition of the
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and Freedom Union (UW), initiating a second phase of the
coalition-building process.
455.3.4  COALITION-BUILDING:  PHASE  TWO
Proposal actor  Veto actor
Office of the Plenipotentiary  x  x
Solidarity Electoral Action  x  x
Freedom Union  x
Total  2  3
While  both center-right parties broadly supported fundamental reform, the change  of
government disrupted the coalition-building process in Poland, delaying further legislation until
the new government recommitted to  the specific reform ideas contained in  Security through
Diversity.  Solidarity Electoral Action still supported the original Solidarity trade union proposal
for reform, and in  particular wanted the government to  reconsider how to  use privatization
revenues to finance the pension system, a key aspect of the Solidarity proposal.  Freedom Union
support for Security through Diversity was less problematic, since a number of Freedom Union-
affiliated experts served on the OP team.  Still, it took a while to appoint a new government
plenipotentiary, which slowed the process of legislative drafting.  Civil society interest groups
began increasingly to mobilize against reform, particularly the influential Federation of Trade
Unions of Polish State Railway Employees, which opposed folding the railway workers' pension
system  into  the  general  one.  Meanwhile,  the  broad  political  consensus  that  led  to  the
overwhelming passage of the first set of legislation began to break down (cf. Hausner 1998, 37-
3  8). The new government refused to work directly with the outgoing Alliance of the Democratic
Left (SLD).  Former Labor Minister Miller was elected to lead the SLD parliamentary caucus in
opposition and, having never supported fundamental reform, tried to mobilize the party against
it.  Work on the new information technology system for ZUS also  slowed down, eventually
causing a delay in the launch of the second pillar until April 1999.
Despite these problems, the coalition agreement signed by  Solidarity Electoral Action
and Freedom Union in November 1997 recommitted the government to pension reform as part of
an aggressive package  of four major reforms, including pensions, health-care, education and
local administration.  A new minister was appointed to coordinate the social sector reforms,
Teresa Kaminska of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS).  Ewa Lewicka of AWS was appointed
Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform as well as a Secretary of State in the Ministry of
Labor.  With her appointment, the OP returned to the Ministry of Labor.  Lewicka fully and
enthusiastically accepted the Security through Diversity program, and intensified the work started
by her predecessors (Chlon et al. 1999, 14).  The prime minister also appointed a new president
of ZUS, Stanislaw Alot (AWS). This meant that all the important for social security system posts
were taken by  AWS, disturbing the Freedom Union, which wanted its  candidate  appointed
president of ZUS.
The new government, dominated by Solidarity appointees, made few significant changes
in the design of reform. ZUS president Alot re-negotiated the infornation  technology contract
and launched personnel changes in ZUS - a behemoth with 40,000 employees - ostensibly to
prepare it for becoming a clearinghouse for pension payments, but also to replace many mid-
level managers with political appointees. AWS also adopted a new policy on the retirement age.
In line with the party's conservative social values, AWS recommended keeping the retirement
age at the level of 60 for women and 65 for men, rather than 62 for both men and women
proposed in Security through Diversity.  While an NDC first pillar had always been part of the
Security through Diversity program, the government made the strategic decision that the first
pillar law should not just  be  amended, but completely rewritten, to  cover all the regulations
46concerning the old-age and disability pensions for the entire population covered.  This slowed
(town the deliberative process in parliament and changecd  one of the basic political strategies of
the pension reform up to that point: to leave the present first pillar rules intact in order to avoid
lengthy debates.  Rewriting the first pillar law allowed the government to  combine a slew of
previously-enacted legislation and rules into one single text, and also allowed the incorporation
of two new groups into the first pillar: employees of the uniformed forces born after December
31, 1968, and judges  and prosecutors.  Judges and prosecutors, a key state interest group, later
mnanaged  to avoid inclusion in the new system.
Public deliberation with civil society interest grcups produced additional changes.  The
second set of draft laws was presented to the Tripartite (Commission  at the beginning of March
1998. Some of the main issues discussed concerned the legal status of ZUS, which the trade
unions wanted to be kept strictly separate from the state budget.  However, many other aspects
were  discussed,  and  government  legislative drafts  were  deeply  refined  and  revised  during
tripartite negotiations, thanks in part to trade union representatives, who commented on elements
of  the first  pillar  law  connected with  occupational schemes and  early retirement  privileges
iespecially  for  miners,  with  co-operation from the  Solidarity miners'  union  leader Henryk
Nakonieczny).  Some differences proved impossible to reconcile.  Within the tripartite working
gJroup  on pension reform, union representatives also expressed concerns about the pension rights
of people with occupational privileges, which were to  be abolished for younger workers. The
unions also differed from the office of the plenipotentiary on benefit indexation and on equal
retirement ages for men and women.  The OP was unsuccessful in trying to convince the unions
of an equal retirement age.  The OPZZ trade union cormplained  it could not keep up with rapid
changes in the draft laws, and did not have time consult the proposal with all its constituents. 3
Therefore, the Tripartite Commission did not work out a final common position on the first pillar
and  pension  system  laws.  Both  major  trade  unions  sent  qualified  negative  opinions  to
parliament, especially on the first pillar law, expressirng  their concern about the issue of the
occupational privileges.  However, the unions did not mobilize to oppose the pension reform.
Instead, a pact was reached between the government and the trade unions to allow the legislative
process to go ahead, with the thorny issue of how to adapt s,pecial privileges to be negotiated
with union representatives starting in the middle of 1998.  H:owever,  this coincided with local
government elections and the government did not want to have any serious political discussions
before them. Negotiations were thus postponed until 1999.
Poland launched a major public relations campaign in April 1997. In its first stage, until
September 1998, the campaign focused on creating a general image of the reform and informing
the main groups involved - unions, employers, public opinion leaders (politicians and media) -
about the main principles of the new pension system.  PR activities in the first stage included
conducting opinion polls  about the old pension system, creating a  reform logo  and  graphic
informational materials,  training OP and ZUS employees in  communication techniques, and
preparing an OP web page, http://reformaemerytalna.mpips.gov.plI/
During public deliberation, the government continued its internal consultations on the
new pension legislation.  Most of the comments came from the Ministry of Finance and related
to financial aspects of the proposed system. Other discussions on system coverage concerned the
Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Labor.  A series of informal meetings took place
with the representatives of the Church, concerning covering ihe clergy by the mandatory social
security system and methods of financing (using the sources of a special Church Fund, which
was at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance).  Before the draft laws were sent to parliament,
judges were excluded from the mandatory system, as a result of their constitutional right to the
proper remuneration after the end of an active career, which was pointed out by the legislative
3 According  to their  statute,  members  of Tripartite  Commission  have four  weeks  to prepare  opinions  on the draft
laws  presented  to them by Government.
47department of the Prime Minister's office. This illustrates the power of well-placed state interest
groups in pension reform.
The government approved the two second-phase laws on April 28, 1998, and sent them to
parliament, asking it to form an Extraordinary Commission to discuss the government proposals,
as with the first set of laws. This time, however, the government did not ask for a quick process
of discussions. The issues covered by the laws were, in the opinion of most decision-makers, too
complex to allow for such a procedure.
The extraordinary commission of parliament for pension reform began its meetings in
May 1998. However, a dispute broke out among the partisan veto actors over who to appoint as
President of the Commission.  Freedom Union argued that it should chair the committee, since
AWS held all the main social sector posts in the government.  However, one  AWS deputy
thought that she should have recognition for her involvement in the reform process (she was a
member of Solidarity team that prepared the union's proposal for refonn and participated at the
meetings of tripartite  commission). Discussions on this  issue lasted  for a  couple  of weeks.
Finally, a Freedom Union MP - Jan Litynski - was appointed president of the commission with
votes  from the  Freedom Union and  the opposition Alliance of the  Democratic Left.  This
indicated that pension reform would not rely solely on votes from coalition deputies, but would
include some representatives of  opposition parties as well.  In addition to  the two  coalition
parties having slightly different views on several issues, some AWS deputies did not support the
reforrn in full.  Meanwhile, the Democratic Left was split between a managerial faction that
supported radical change, and trade unionists who opposed key aspects of the reform.
As a result of these differences among the key partisan veto actors, when the commission
started work on the first pillar law, it had to focus on each paragraph, discussing it in detail. This
was mainly a result of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) strategy.  Because its government had
initiated reform, the party could not turn against the law directly. But in opposition, the left-wing
party tried to delay the process and avoid approving difficult changes in first pillar rules, which
were against the interests of affiliated trade unions.  The party opposed lowering replacement
rates,  elirminating income  redistribution,  and  eliminating  occupational  privileges  in  the
mandatory system.  As a result, discussions in the extraordinary commission took much longer
than expected. However, the SLD was not exactly a veto player, since the coalition government
should have had enough votes to  pass legislation on its own.  However, many of the SLD's
objections  drew considerable sympathy from  deputies of  the governing  Solidarity Electoral
Action, which also had a sizeable trade union component, and on matters of detail, the pro-
reform coalition cut across partisan lines.
While the key partisan veto actors were finalizing reform legislation in parliament, new
actors were being created as a result of implementation of the second-pillar law.  In mid-1998,
the regulatory agency for the second pillar, UNFE, was established.  Cezary Mech, a member of
the Christian National Union, a constituent party of Solidarity Electoral Action, was appointed
president.  Co-operation between UNFE and the office of the plenipotentiary was very difficult,
since Mech proved to be a great fan of the Chilean-type reform and did not want to accept the
different approach expressed in the Polish second pillar law.  Some degree of co-operation was
finally established by the end of 1998. UNFE was the first of the new policy actors to be created
in the early implementation stage of reform.  As a result of the stalemate in parliament, the
government decided  to  delay launch  of the  second pillar  until  April  1999.  However, the
licensing process for pension societies and pension funds started as planned in August 1998.
This enhanced the irreversibility of the reform process, since most of the Polish and international
companies operating in the Polish market (banks, investment funds and insurance companies)
became stakeholders in  the new  pension  funds. Withdrawing the  reform  plan would  have
endangered the Polish governnent's reputation as a reliable business partner.  Thus some of the
48new actors created as a result of implementation facilitated completion of the reform process,
while others, like UNFE, added new complications.
Because of upcoming local elections and the shrinking time until implementation, the
parliamentary commission decided to stop discussing the first pillar law and switch to the Social
Security System law in August, the so-called "mother"  law. The final version of this law was
accepted  in  October. Major  changes introduced in  parliament  included  covering only  new
entrants to the uniformed forces and excluding prosecutors from the mandatory system.  These
1wo important revisions show that special state interest groups had a substantial impact on the
debate in parliament.
Parliament returned to the first pillar law in October.  The main issue remained how to
deal with special occupational pensions granted under the ol(  regime.  Trade unions began to
exert pressure at the beginning of December, when the 'Solidarity  miners' trade union, under the
Leadership  of  Henryk Nakonieczny and Mr. Grajcarek protested against the  proposals being
discussed.  After several meetings with the Minister of Labor and the plenipotentiary, miners'
concerns grew, and they decided to take protest measures. Representatives of the miners' union
occupied the Ministry  of Labor for two  days, demanding that the government extend  early
:etirement options for miners by adopting so-called "bridging" pensions before the first pillar law
was implemented. Under the proposed law, all miners who had worked less than 17 years under
ground would have to continue working until age 65, instead of retiring after 25 years of working
underground, regardless of age, as under the old system.  Miners'  concern about the pension
system was enhanced by the process of coal industry restructuring that was closing down some
mines. Negotiations also included the mining employers' organization.  Employers promised to
finance a part of a future bridging arrangement.  The unions were partially satisfied with the
solution, however they demanded a legislative solution before the first pillar law was adopted.
Finally, the Polish Senate adopted a  slight change in article 41 of the first pillar  law, which
promised to  include  bridging  pensions  in  another  legal  act.  After  the  adoption  of  this
amendment, the miners left the  Ministry building. After these events, other miners'  unions
(OPZZ and branch unions not covered by the two national union centers) called for a strike, but
did not stop the legislative process.  The greater impact of the Solidarity-affiliated  unions shows
that the impact of civil society interest groups depends on their access to  key veto actors in
government and parliament.
Deliberation in parliament produced additional changes. An amendment to the first pillar
law allowed a  lower retirement age for those who fulfilled the work experience criteria for
retirement, but had not reached the normal retirement age.  This provision reflected increased
dissatisfaction from both the OPZZ and Solidarity trade unions.  A final dispute concerned
indexation rates. Parliament decided that "notional capital" in the individual first-pillar accounts
would be indexed quarterly to 75% of total wage fund growth. This was intended by deputies to
prevent indexation rates from being decided ad hoc in the aninual  budget law. The government
side had proposed a less generous half-price-half-wage  indexation, but parliament did not accept
this proposal.  Advocates of lower indexation argued that this would allow contribution rates to
fall more quickly, reducing unemployment, while opponents argued that it would have too great
an impact on replacement rates, hurting pensioners.  Opposition deputies disliked the notional
defined  contribution  first  pillar  altogether,  pointing  out  that  it  would  reduce  income
redistribution.  Therefore, coalition deputies provided the votes to adopt the first pillar law on
December 17. President Aleksander Kwasniewski, a former leader of the opposition Democratic
Left Alliance, signed the law on December 29 and on January 1, 1999 Poland's new pension
system entered the implementation phase.
495.3.5  IMPLEMENTATION
Key features of the Polish reform are the change to a "notional defined contribution" first
pillar, the establishment of mandatory, private second pillar funds for pension savings, and the
creation of a legal framework for new types of third pillar voluntary funds (see Chlon et al. 1999
for a complete description). For employees participating in the new system, a payroll tax of
12.22% of gross wages will be contributed to an individual notional capital account and 7.3% to
a  private pension  fund of the  employees' choice. An additional payroll  tax of  17.48% will
continue to fund the disability pension system and a few other benefits paid by ZUS. Employees
aged 30 and under must participate in both the new first and second pillars. Workers between the
ages of 30 and 50 can choose whether to participate in the second pillar, or only in the reformed
first pillar.  People over 50 remain outside the new system.  Several possibilities were created for
the third pillar, including individual pension insurance and employer group funds, that may be
set up and managed by consortia of employers and workers' representatives, including trade
unions.  The Solidarity trade union was involved in setting up the first such  consortium, in
cooperation with several leading financial institutions.
Some major design decisions continued to be made in the early implementation phase.  In
early 1999, the government renewed negotiations with trade unions over a  "bridging law" that
would resolve the thorny issue of occupational privileges. A special medical committee prepared
new criteria for early retirement, forming the basis for bridging arrangements to be negotiated
between the government, unions and employers.  These criteria allow early retirement for those
who work in special conditions (such as work under ground or under water) that might influence
the health status of the employee; and those who perform work of a special character (such as
pilots and train engine drivers), that requires very good psychological and physical conditions for
the public safety.
Implementation also  showed up  a  lack of preparedness of ZUS  and  its  information
technology system, resulting in widespread public outcry, although this did not stop millions of
Poles from joining the new, private pillar. Initially, all ZUS branches and offices were flooded by
customers, eager to get forms, software and information about the reform. In order to facilitate
public information, ZUS prepared new rules on sending information to ZUS and special software
for employers to  allow them to send necessary information via computer data transfers. The
pension fund regulatory agency UNFE also began its work in February  1999, monitoring the
activities of the pension funds, their advertising campaigns, and registering fund agents.
In October 1998, the implementation stage of the public relations campaign started. The
main goal of this campaign was to inform people about new pension system rules and the choices
for different age groups.  It created a call-center, starting in March 1999, through which anyone
would be able to  order a  brochure about the new pension  system and have basic questions
answered.  In February, a media campaign was launched to inform people about the call-center,
how the reform affects different age  groups, and promoting the new  ZUS.  In  addition to
television ads, the Polish telephone company sent a reform booklet out with its April telephone
bills.  Government officials, parliamentary deputies and journalists had previously been invited
on study tours to Chile, Argentina, Hungary and Sweden to leam about pension reform ideas that
influenced the Polish model, with financing from a World Bank grant. The study tours developed
understanding of reforms  in other countries, resulting in support for the Polish reform.  On
February  16, pension  funds were  allowed to  start their  own advertising  campaigns and  the
scramble for members began. Their activities are closely watched by UNFE, which intervenes in
cases of unfair advertisements.
In April  1999, the office of the plenipotentiary was officially dissolved.  Some of its
employees shifted to the Department of Social Security at the Ministry of Labor, and some left
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campaign  and  stimulate  cooperation between institutions, especially ZUS  and  UNFE.  In
addition, some legislative steps were taken in order to sort out mistakes that were made in the
legislative process and to consider new laws including the bridging law, an annuity companies
law, and a national actuary law, since the defined contribution system requires thorough actuarial
supervision.  Work on reforming the disability and the farmers lpension  system, two controversial
elements  of the pension system that were left aside for political reasons (Hausner 1998, 34) was
planned to begin in the second half of 1999.
C.3.6  CONCLUSIONS
This section will conclude by reviewing the Polish case in light of the six hypotheses
formulated above.  The first suggested that policy legacies influence present reform choices.  In
Ploland,  as in Hungary, the size of the implicit pension debt appears to  have played a role in
convincing reformers that  only  a  partial privatization of  the  pension  system  was feasible.
Hlowever, full  privatization  was  probably  not  feasible  froim a  political  standpoint  either.
Reformers' decisions were guided by fiscal considerations, but also by political factors, such as
the existence of veto actors within the government who wanted to maintain a large PAYG state
pension system.  Policy legacies thus played a role in restricting the size of Poland's private
pillar, through a variety of different mechanisms, both economic and political.
A second hypothesis was that the fewer the number of veto and proposal actors and the
smaller the distance between them, the greater the change in scope and size of the PAYG pension
system.  Poland provides an interesting contrast to Hurigary.  While the number of veto and
proposal actors at most phases in Poland was equal to, or exceeded the number in Hungary, after
ihe elimination of the Ministry of Labor as an independent prroposal  actor in early 1996, the
proposals of the various actors in Poland were closer together. No proposal actor disagreed with
the implementation of a funded pillar after that time. This enabled a  somewhat more radical
r eform to go forward in Poland, despite a high number of veto actors, a change of government,
and a two-phase legislative process involving both government and opposition.  The Poland-
H4ungary  comparison also shows the importance of proposal actors.  While Hungary's Pension
Jlnsurance  Fund was not  a  veto actor, its proposal was taken seriously by  some trade union
leaders, and through them, exercised a major influence on the size of the second pillar, scaling it
back considerably through negotiations.  In the absence of a proposal actor who opposed the
implementation of a private pillar in Poland, trade unions never demanded a reduction in the size
of the funded pillar.  Instead, trade unions focused their attention on maintaining early retirement
benefits and separate treatment for certain categories of workers.
The impact of interest groups in Poland did depend on their relations to key veto players,
as predicted in hypothesis three.  Judges and prosecutors, legal interest groups closely connected
t:o the government, won special dispensation from the new  system.  The military was  less
successful, although only its younger employees will participate in the new system.  While the
independent railway workers' union failed to maintain the independence of its special pension
system, both the railway workers and the Solidarity-affiliated,  miners' union won some special
concessions on early retirement provisions. Especially notable in Poland is that both major trade
anion federations were affiliated with major veto actors, but both supported fundamental reform.
Trade union federations' support for reform was critical to its passage in Poland.  Trade unions
now participate as co-founders of second-pillar funds (Solidarity), and as co-founders of third-
pillar voluntary, employer-based schemes. These opportunities for participation were critical to
winning their support for reform, as in Argentina (Brooks and James 1999).
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extensive.  World Bank funding was critical to the establishment and operations of the Office of
the Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform.  World Bank  reform ideas were transmitted
directly through the  appointment of  a  Bank official as head of  the plenipotentiary's  office.
Again, while Poland had  extensive direct World Bank intervention, it had  less  fundamental
change than  Kazakhstan, where  World Bank  direct  intervention was  more  limited.  What
accounts for this?  First, it indicates that the presence of a relatively high number of veto and
proposal actors and a large implicit pension debt constrained what the World Bank could do.
Second, it demonstrates that the transmission of reform ideas is often more powerful than direct
interventions.  In Poland, for instance, the idea to develop a notional defined contribution first
pillar arose from the personal experience of the Polish World Bank official who headed Poland's
office of the plenipotentiary.  This official had previously worked in Latvia, implementing a
notional defined contribution first pillar there and thus had ideas that differed from the model in
Averting the Old Age Crisis.  Thus, the exact reform ideas of individual reformers, and their
personal experiences, are as important in shaping the details of reform as direct World Bank
interventions in policy planning.
The fifth and sixth hypotheses concerned tradeoffs across deliberative fora and phases of
reform.  Polish reformers clearly traded off  a rapid reform process  in  favor of  widespread
agreement among the main partisan veto actors.  A large part of this was the decision to make
parliament the main deliberative forum for a complete revision of the first  pillar law.  The
reasons they did so are complex.  First, earlier experience with attempted pension reform had
shown that there were a multiplicity of effective veto actors, and reform was not possible without
broad societal agreement.  Second, because the pension issue tended to cut across party lines in
both coalition governments, it may not have been possible to pass legislation in either parliament
without opposition support.  Third, both the government and the Solidarity trade union wanted
fundamental reform, and were ready to compromise on particulars to achieve it.  Whatever the
reasons, acceptance of fundamental pension reform by most parties means that Poland is unlikely
to suffer the type of design reversals that occurred in Hungary in the early implementation stage,
when a new government came to power and scaled back the private pillar.  Poland may have
traded extensive deliberation in the earlier stages, and reliance upon parliament as the  main
deliberative forum, for greater stability in reform implementation.
6  ACTORS  AND  THE  POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL  CONTEXT
While these three case studies have focused on structural features of the policy process,
this section focuses on policy actors, comparing their involvement in the three cases.  Who are
the main actors in pension reform?  What are their preferences?  Do their preferences change
over time?  And under  what conditions do they support fundamental pension  reform?  This
section first considers the role of institutional and partisan veto actors, and then civil society and
state interest groups typically involved in reform.  It analyzes the importance of each actor, and
shows that their preferences  and positions on pension reform are neither fixed,  nor wholly
predictable based  on their  structural position in  the broader political economy.  Rather, the
positions of most actors have proven to be relatively flexible, depending on perceived interests
that may differ widely from those of similar interest groups in advanced industrial countries.
The political economy of  social sector reform has  often focused on  the problem  of
overcoming resistance from entrenched interest groups. Social programs are often seem to create
their  own politics  by  endowing groups with  a  shared interest  in  guarding certain benefits.
Pierson (1994) argues that "policy creates politics" insofar as the structure of particular policies
determine the  strength  and  cohesiveness of  beneficiary interest  groups.  Their  institutional
strength then partially determines the extent to which reformers can change or withdraw benefits.
Nelson (1998) extends this type of analysis by suggesting that certain government agencies have
52clear interests in the perpetuation of particular social policies.  In the postcommunist context,
Nelson posits  an institutional interest on the part of welfare and  social policy ministries to
perpetuate the current PAYG pension system, which they have had  a hand in setting up and
administering, while ministries of finance typically support fundamental pension reform. Nelson
illustrates this thesis with examples from Poland and Hungary.
Nelson (1998) further seeks to explain why pension reform was possible in these two
cases, while health care reform was not. 4 Her answer was that pension reform may not be as
politically difficult as health reform, thanks to the relative lack of specific, concentrated interest
groups that have a stake in the old system. In the health care sector, concentrated interest groups
such as doctors, nurses, and health ministries are all likely to lose in a comprehensive reform,
and therefore to engage in anti-reform mobilization. Fundamental pension reform does not affect
concentrated interest groups in the same way.  In the first place, the World Bank advocates
pension reform that is designed to minimize impacts on current pensioners, by excluding them
from the change of system.  Excluding current pensioners neutralizes their concerns and prevents
anti-reform mobilization  from the  most  concentrated group of  beneficiaries.  Furthermore,
allowing middle-aged workers a choice to join the new system, or to opt out, averts potential
resistance from current workers and trade unionists.  Meanwhile, younger workers and new
e ntrants to the labor force are likely to gain from privatizing pension reform, since they will have
a longer period of compounded investment gains.  Young people therefore provide a potential
constituency for fundamental reforrn in  all countries.  Thus  fundamental pension  reform is
designed the minimize  anti-reforn  mobilization from concentrated interest groups, much as
Pierson (1994) would recommend.
Still, fundamental pension reform often involves a reduction in overall replacement rates,
and harms the interests of groups enjoying special privileges under the old system.  Therefore,
reformers may expect resistance from certain state and civil society interest groups, including
trade unions, pensioners' associations, and state pension administrations, that have an interest in
the old PAYG system.  Likewise, reformers may come under pressure from new actors created
by pension reform, particularly prospective managers of private pension funds.
How do institutional and partisan veto actors perceive their own interests in reform?
How do they deal with participation of civil society actors? This section begins with a review of
the role of institutional and partisan veto and proposal actors in reform, and then turns to a
consideration of state and civil society interest groups to assess their impact on reform.
4.1  INSTITUTIONAL  VETO AND PROPOSAL ACTORS
Do institutional veto and proposal actors have predictable positions on reform? Drawing
on evidence from Hungary and Poland, Nelson (1998) argues that Ministries of Finance typically
support fundamental pension reform, while Ministries of Labor and state pension administrations
support rationalization of the old PAYG system.  On the other hand, in Kazakhstan, pension
reform was pushed by  a  National  Securities Committee, with  equal  support from both  the
Ministries of Finance and Labor. In Slovenia, reform waLs  pushed by the Minister of Labor, with
a lesser degree of cooperation from the Ministry of Finance.  [n Sweden, reform was developed
by the state pension administration.
Therefore, while finance ministries are more likely to support fundamental reform than
welfare ministries,  all  things  being  equal, these  case  studies  show  that  the  positions  of
institutional actors also often depends on personnel decisions that reflect the outcome of partisan
political and  ideological struggles within governments.  If  a prime  minister or  president is
'Although Poland later reformed its health care system in 1999.
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fundamental reform.  This happened in Kazakhstan, with the appointment of Minister of Labor
and  Social Protection Natalya  Korzhova, in  Hungary, with  the  appointment of  Minister of
Welfare Mihaly Kokeny,  and  Poland, with  the  appointment of  Minister of  Labor  Andrzej
Baczkowski.
Support of the  government, the key  veto actor in  all three reforms  considered here,
depends a great deal on support of the prime minister, who has the power to appoint the ministers
who hold veto power over reform within the government itself. In all three cases, pension reform
took place after cabinet reshuffles in which anti-reform ministers were replaced by pro-reform
ones on the decision of a prime minister who was recently appointed or became committed to
reform.  In Kazakhstan, pro-reform ministers were appointed on the authority of Prime Minister
Kazhegeldin and  President Nazarbaev, to  indicate cormmitment  to  fundamental reform.  In
Hungary,  the victory  of  liberals  within the  socialist-liberal government coincided  with  the
resignation of an anti-reform Minister of Welfare, Pal Kovacs, and Prime Minister Gyula Horn's
decision to appoint reformer Lajos Bokros Minister of Finance.  In Poland, the appointment of
Prime Minister Wlodziemierz Cimoszewicz paved the way for the removal of reform's  major
opponent within the government, Labor Minister Leszek Miller, and the appointment of reformer
Andrzej Baczkowski in his place.  In each case, support from the key institutional veto actors
was central to  government commitment to  reform, while the  institutional positions  of key
ministries changed over time.
6.2  PARTISAN VETO AND PROPOSAL  ACTORS
Partisan veto actors provide a bridge between government and society.  Parties typically
represent one side of a historically defined social cleavage: communist versus anti-communist,
urban versus rural, or rich versus poor.  Do partisan actors have pre-determined positions  on
fundamental pension reform?  This research suggests they do not.  One surprising aspect of this
type of pension reforn  is the extent to which it cuts across these historical social divisions in
postcommunist Europe. Left parties have supported fundamental pension reform as an answer to
the widespread crisis of the postcommunist welfare state. Right and liberal parties are sometimes
ideologically committed to the privatization that lies at the root of fundarnental  reform.  But both
left and right parties also tend to contain interest groups that oppose fundamental reform.  For
this reason, partisan veto actors often play a role in moderating reform proposals.  In Hungary
and Poland, the left parties that implemented reform included both liberal leadership groups that
embraced change and traditional left constituencies that opposed it, and fought to reduce the size
of the  funded, private  pillar.  Similar divisions exist between the  economically-liberal and
populist wings of the right parties in both countries.  Only smaller liberal parties are relatively
consistent supporters of  fundamental pension reform.  However, the cross-cutting appeal of
fundamental pension reform generally means that most parties will contain some sympathizers,
and  also  some  opponents.  This  may  broaden the  appeal  of  reform,  but  also  limit  its
consequences.
6.3  INTEREST  GROUPS
Interest groups may have an impact on reform by mobilizing against reform and seeking
to play a veto role, by formulating their own encompassing reform proposals, or by advocating a
more narrow agenda that guards group interests within the reform.  Most interest groups follow
the latter route, although there are some cases of interest groups threatening to play a veto role, as
in Hungary, or formulating their own proposals, as in Poland.  Generally, we can distinguish
among two types of interest groups: state interest groups that reflect the interests of some part of
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relatively independent segment of society.  Interest groups are expected to have an impact on
reform that  is closely related to  their relations with key institutional  and partisan veto and
proposal actors.  This section will discuss four of the most important interest groups involved in
reform in the three cases - trade unions, pensioners' associations, state pension administrations,
and private pension funds - their influence in the reform p.rocess, and how they have been
convinced to support fundamental reform.
6.3.1  TRADE UNIONS
Trade unions in the postcommunist states can be clivided  into two types: those that played
a prominent role in the socialist system as "transition belts" of party commands to the working
class  --  what  I  will  call  "old" trade  unions --  and  "new" trade  unions  with  roots  in  the
anticommunist opposition.  "Old" trade unions are sometimes allied with communist successor
parties or other left parties, while "new" trade unions gravitate toward right-wing, Christian-
Democratic, or nationalist parties.  Politicized historical divisions often place "old" and "new"
irade unions at odds on contemporary policy matters.  Their positions on fundamnental  pension
reform therefore must be discussed separately.
6.3.1.1  OLD  TRADE UNIONS
Old trade unions have deep roots in the prior regime. They typically have reformed since
Ihe  transition,  in  most  cases  changing their  name  and  organizational structure,  and  even
personnel.  The  degree  of  transformation differs quite  radically  from  country to  country.
Hlowever  old unions tend to suffer from a negative public image, regardless of their level of
institutional self-renovation.  Old trade unions often remain committed to the social security
instituticns of the prior regime, in part because they p]Layed  a large part in that system, most
naotably  distributing social benefits at the enterprise level, but  also at the national level,  for
instance managing networks of recreational facilities (Cook 1997, 12; Myant and Waller 1994,
177).  Old trade unions often maintained ownership or control over vast economic resources
during the transition, and hence have emerged as relatively powerful economic actors in some
countries, although the management and mismanagement of these resources differs significantly
across countries.  Ownership of real estate is sometimes a key asset for old trade unions (Cook
1997, 12).  However, extensive resources inherited from the past have proved to be a mixed
blessing. While they might allow old unions to do more, in most cases they have prevented them
from behaving like a  "real" trade unions in the Western sense.  Union leaders are often more
concerned with managing their economic empires than with day-to-day organizational issues.
Efforts to organize workers, new private workplaces, or undertake other representative activities
are often minimal (Cook 1997, 18).  Their economic resources and organizational inheritance
from  the  past  (including  an  extensive  network  of  enterprise  offices,  often  maintained  at
mnterprises'  expense), has made them less willing and able to engage in effective new pursuits
(Myant and Waller 1994, 177). Relative wealth has also made them targets of resentment from
new trade unions, compounding historical disputes. In many postcommunist countries, including
the three countries discussed here, there is a raging battle between old and new unions over
disposition of old trade union assets (Bartlett 1997, 152). New unions want a share of old union
assets in the spirit of  democratization and free competition; this  leads to  intense in-fighting
among the unions, and hampers potential cooperation.
Because of the left-leaning political and social views of their leaders, their institutional
interests, and their connections with the past regime, old trade unions in  the postcommunist
countries tend to oppose radical pension reform. Such oipposition  may be ideological, rooted in a
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cases, old trade union opposition may be rooted in their institutional interests, for instance in
protecting extensive special privileges of powerful sectoral trade unions, or maintaining trade
union provision of social services.  Nonetheless, in two of the three cases studied here, Poland
and Hungary, old trade unions have been convinced to accept the partial transition to a funded
system, despite inherent or inherited predispositions.
In Kazakhstan, pension reform went ahead despite old trade union opposition.  In this
case, trade unions'  ability to pursue their interests was limited by their lack of access to the
policy process in a strong presidential regime. Old trade unions consistently voiced opposition to
radical pension reform proposals and emphasized the lack of guarantees in the new system, the
lack  of  an  adequate  minirnum  pension  guarantee, and  the  lack  of  public  confidence  in
government  promises,  though  they  did  not  mobilize  workers  against  reform  prior  to
implementation.  Had the parliament had effective veto power, Kazakh trade unions probably
would have had  more  influence on the  final shape of  reform, since their  claims met  with
sympathy in parliament.  Indeed, after reform was enacted, old trade unions teamed up with a
group of parliamentarians to reintroduce special privileges into the pension law (see section 5.1.4
above).
In  Hungary too, the old trade union federation (MSZOSZ), initially opposed pension
reform.  Its representatives on the Pension Insurance Fund (PIF) supervisory board fought the
introduction of a mandatory funded system and instead proposed changes to the existing PAYG
system.  However, union leaders were eventually convinced to support reform through a series of
political  deals.  Some  involved actual changes to  the pension  reform project,  while  others
provided institutional  advantages to  the old trade union organizations.  Old trade unions  in
Hungary pushed for additional guarantees to  the second, private pillar, for  a smaller second
pillar, for a larger guaranteed minimum pension, higher indexation, and for  lower eligibility
requirements for vesting in the second pillar (see section 5.2.3 above).  Compromises were made
in the forum of the Interest Reconciliation Council that satisfied trade union concerns on most
grounds, without undermining the radical nature of the reform.  The size of the second pillar
contribution was reduced from 10% to 8%, and phased in over two years, starting at 6% in 1998.
Trade unions agreed to Swiss indexation, but won large real increases in pension levels a priori.
A number of other compromises were reached.
The old trade unions also accepted political-institutional side-payments to secure their
acceptance of radical pension reform, winning "delegation" of seats on the Pension and Health
Insurance Fund  supervisory  boards,  instead of  facing popular  election.  This  particularly
benefited the old trade unions, which had won elections in 1993, institutionalizing their control
over substantial financial resources. However, this political bargain proved short-lived.  The
entire substantive and institutional bargain with the old trade unions was overturned when the
Socialist Party lost elections in May 1998 to the right-wing party, FIDESZ.  FIDESZ cancelled
promised increases in pension levels, froze contributions to the private funded pillar at 6%, and
eliminated the independent Pension and Health Insurance Funds altogether.  In any case, the
gains secured by the trade unions in Hungary were short term.  Palacios and Rocha (1998) have
shown that the compromises made to the old trade unions and other groups in Hungary's Interest
Reconciliation Council (IRC) would have cost between 0.5 and 1.0 percent of GDP during the
first years of transition to the new system, but would have had little after 15 years.  This suggests
that old trade unions may be  bought off by concessions that have a  short- to  medium-term
impact, but do not fundamentally threaten reform over the long term.
In Poland, the main old trade union federation (OPZZ) came to  support reform after
negotiations in that country's tripartite council -- a body like the IRC in  Hungary that brings
together govermnent, business, and labor representatives for regular discussions over important
legislative and  socioeconomic matters.  In  an  official resolution  of  the  OPZZ trade  union
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contribution to the second, funded pillar (Resolutions 1998, 8).  This agreement was the product
of negotiations within the tripartite body, and also may have reflected competition with the
Solidarity trade union, which supported fundamental pension reform.  However, the OPZZ did
emphasize certain conditions to  its  support, and pursued these vigorously  in  parliamentary
debates on pension reform.  The OPZZ demanded that the PAYG pillar remain the "main source
cf income for present and future pensioners," and expressed concern over how the government
vwould  fund the deficit in the public pillar.  OPZZ also opposed changes to the retirement age,
minimum pension levels, indexation changes, and special privileges that were essential parts of
the pension reform in Poland.  Since the switch to a notional defined contribution system for the
first  pillar  in Poland  was  equally important to  the  introduction of a  second  pillar,  OPZZ's
conditional support for a partially-funded system coincided with effective opposition to  other
elements of the reform.  Thus, old trade unions in Poland agreed in principle, but remained a
difficult ally throughout the legislative process, contributing through their representatives in
rarliament  to point-by-point battles over the reform effcort  in committee debate.  Still, OPZZ's
fLandamental  support for refonrn  prevented it from organizing mass opposition to reform.  OPZZ
vvon a number of concessions for buying out special pension privileges granted under the old
system,  compromises that  would  have  an  important  medium-term impact  on  middle-aged
workers in formerly privileged sectors, but little long-term fiscal impact.  OPZZ also planned a
joint venture with Multica and TBI Holding (a Belgian subsidiary of Bankers Trust) to establish
and market a second-pillar pension insurance fund.  Although its application was rejected, this
suggests that trade unions, new and old, have the potenitial  to strengthen their financial clout
t:brough  second-pillar refonm,  a substantial inducement to support radical change. Polish unions
have been more forward-looking than Hungarian ones in this regard.  It will be interesting to see
wvhether  they will be able to  leverage their extensive working-class networks into long-term
financial power.  In  Poland,  old  trade  unions  clearly saw  potential  financial  benefits  in
participation in the new system, while in Hungary, heavy olcl trade union involvement in the
former pension fund administration made it more resistant to change.
In both Poland and Hungary, old trade union support for reform was also facilitated by
participation in  left party coalition governments at the time  of reform.  Participation  in left
clectoral  alliances  encouraged  old  unions  to  accede to  government pension  reform  plans,
particularly since right-wing parties in postcommunist Europe often have adversarial relations
with old trade unions, and cooperation across this historical-political divide would be even more
cifficult.  Pension reform in the parliamentary democracies of Central Europe has so far been
iaitiated by center-left governments.  This can be explainied,  in part, by the potential opposition
role of the old trade unions, and their greater potential for cooperation with social policy reforms
iaitiated by a left government.  A right govermnent proposing similar measures would likely
rrieet with organized resistance from the old trade unions that are often major political opponents
of the right.
69.3.1.2  NEW TRADE UNIONS
New trade unions built by the anticommunist opposition have tended to support market-
oriented reforms (Ost and Weinstein 1999, 9), including the introduction of individual private
pensions.  The Free Trade Union Congress of Kazakhstan supported radical reform, as did the
Solidarity trade union  in Poland.  Right-wing trade unions in Hungary were split, with  some
supporting reform and others opposed, but none organized mLass  resistance to the reform, nor
took  any action  which  impeded the progress of  reform or  forced significant compromises.
l,xperience shows that new trade unions can be natural allies of radical pension reform.  New
trade unions tend to be smaller and less powerful than old trade unions, although Solidarity in
lPoland  is an exception to this rule. New trade union support also may act to neutralize old trade
union opposition.
57New trade unions exist in all postcommunist countries, but are usually less powerful than
old  trade unions.  In Kazakhstan, for instance, the Free Trade  Union Congress has  always
operated in the shadow of its conservative rivals, without the inheritance of important resources
and  networks from  the  past.  Since civil  society development has  been  suppressed under
President Nazarbaev (Olcott 1997), there is little prospect for the Free Trade Unions to improve
their organization or access to financial resources.  In Hungary, a number of right-wing trade
unions exist, with varying degrees of membership and political support.  However, none have
been particularly active in the policy process.  Poland is the big exception in this regard, with its
Solidarity trade union playing an enormous role in contemporary politics.  Solidarity played a
central role in toppling communism in Poland, and its successor organizations have dominated
several postcommunist Polish governments. Solidarity Electoral Action, an alliance of right-wing
parties led by the Solidarity trade union, is currently the senior government coalition partner,
along with the Freedom Union, which also has its roots in the Solidarity movement.  Solidarity
also has its own independent expert capacity for policy formulation.
Solidarity, like most  other new trade unions, has always  favored the introduction of
market reforms, with a  social or Christian-democratic twist.  In the case of pension  reform,
Solidarity prepared its own pension reform proposal, based on a rationalized PAYG pillar, and
individual private pension funds established with privatization assets.  In essence, Solidarity's
program was not far from the Security through Diversity concept, except for the way it suggested
employing privatization assets.  Solidarity had long wanted to promote a type of privatization
that would benefit the whole society, and it proposed a method of using shares of privatized
companies to  endow pension  funds with  individual accounts.  While  this  method was  not
included in full, the Polish program does foresee the use of privatization revenues to fund the
transition deficit, in  a  way that  was hammered out  with  Solidarity officials.  Solidarity was
brought into discussions over pension reform by plenipotentiary Andrzej Baczkowski, and many
of its suggestions were included in the Security through Diversity program.  When Ewa Lewicka
of Solidarity Electoral Action was appointed Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reformn  during
the second phase of coalition-building in Poland, she was able to continue work on the Security
through Diversity without major revisions.  Toward the end of the coalition-building phase, the
Solidarity miners' union took protest action against the reform, arguing for a concessions on the
reform of special privileges granted to miners.  After a multi-day sit-in in the Ministry of Labor,
the miners union agreed in discussions to call off their protest in exchange for a government
assurance that  their  concerns would be  addressed as  soon as reform was  enacted.  It  was
significant that this concession came from a Solidarity government, which had the credibility to
make it convincing.
New  trade  unions  may  also  be  more  likely  to  take  an  active  role  in  economic
opportunities offered by fundamental reform. In Poland, Solidarity is a cofounder of one second
pillar fund, in a joint venture with Zurich Insurance Group.  However, Solidarity is also using
provisions  guaranteeing  union  participation in  third  pillar  enterprise  pension  funds  to  its
advantage, informing its local leaders how to set up third-pillar funds of this type.  The inter-
enterprise third pillar funds, as conceived in Poland, could provide a powerful coordinating role
for Solidarity trade unions.  Similar opportunities for substantial trade union participation in the
third pillar may provide incentives for their support.
6.3.2  PENSIONERS'  ASSOCIATIONS
Oddly, pensioners' associations have played almost no role in pension reform in Hungary
or Poland (Nelson 1998), but they have been prominent in Kazakhstan.  The explanation for this
seems to be that pensioners in Kazakhstan were hyper-mobilized at the time that pension reform
occurred thanks to the arrears crisis, when massive pensioners' protests emerged.  In Poland and
58Hungary, present pensioners were not expected to be affected by radical reform. In order to head
off resistance from present pensioners, reforms advocated.  by the World Bank usually only touch
workers aged 50 and under, who either must participate, or are given the choice to participate, in
the new system (Palacios and Whitehouse 1998). In Kazakhstan, participation in the new system
wvas  made  compulsory for  all  workers, thus  mobilizing opposition  from  workers  nearing
retirement. In other countries, older workers who are most likely to be thinking about retirement
are not affected, and neither are current pensioners.  Pensioners' organizations do exist in most
postcommunist  countries,  but  their  effectiveness may be  limited  by  their  relative  lack  of
importance in major parties' electoral coalitions.  In Poland, as in several other postcommunist
countries, pensioners' parties were founded and competed in elections in 1997.  However, split
between  right  and  left,  they  did  not  win  representation in  parliament.  One  pensioners'
association  affiliated  with  the  Democratic  Left  Alliance did  have  its  concerns  voiced  in
parliament, but its proposals were not adopted.  Political parties remain an important channel for
interest group concerns, and failure to exercise power within established parties has lessened the
influence of pensioners' associations.
The Kazakh case is special, showing that pensioners' associations have the potential to
actively oppose radical reform, but only when previously mobilized and actually threatened by
reform. In Kazakhstan, pension reform took place in the wake of massive arrears crisis.  Payroll
taxes were not collected, or were stolen, and payments were not being made in a timely fashion,
causing street protests  and  hunger  strikes across the country.  These protests  were  loosely
organized by a number of different old peoples' associations.,  including most prominently the
Pokolenie (Generation) movement.  Veterans' associations were also vocal opponents of radical
r  eform. These groups initially mobilized to force the government to honor its pension guarantees
umder the old  system, but  when the  switch to  a  funded system came on the  agenda, these
mobilized groups opposed the change.  They argued vigorous]Ly  against reductions in minimum
pension guarantees under the new system, the phasing out of th,e  PAYG system and the principle
of  intergenerational solidarity,  and  expressed distrust that  reform would  not  affect  current
pensioners.  In theory, the reduction of the payroll tax going to the old system from 25.5% to
15% should not affect the amount spent on present pensions, since the government plans to
finance the spending in some other way.  However, in Kazakhstan, where arrears have been a
major problem and actual monetary intakes had constrained spending in a very ad hoc fashion,
present  pensioners were concerned that their pensions would continue to be reduced or not paid,
should payroll taxes be  reduced. Thus, the  shaky fiscal environment and low confidence in
government played a key role in mobilizing current pensioners against fuLdamental  reform.
5.3.3  STATE  PENSION  ADMINISTRATIONS
State pension administrations in the postcommunmist  countries often contain experts on
pension reform who are predisposed toward reforming the PAYG system, rather than introducing
a mandatory funded pillar.  However, the overall position of state pension administrations has
depended mainly  on political decisions, appointments and leadership, as with ministries.  In
Poland, for  instance,  the president  of ZUS, the  state pension  administration, is  a  political
appointee who serves at the behest of the prime minister and the government.  This has meant
that prime ministers who support reform may appoint Z;US  chiefs who also support reform.  In
such a situation, a capable administrator can prevent other pension administration experts from
voicing opposition to reform, although this is not always possible or desirable.  On the other
hand,  state pension  administrations are sometimes independent of government control, as in
Hungary. There, the leadership of the state pension administration, PIF, was chosen in a general
election by voters for a set term. During the period of reform in Hungary, the PIF was under the
control of representatives mainly from the old trade uniDns. H  lowever, when the prime minister
can  appoint  a  new  head  of  the  pension  administration, its  opposition  can  be  effectively
59neutralized if there is sufficient prime ministerial commitment and through deals that give the old
pension administration a role in the new system.
6.3.4  PRIVATE  PENSION  FUNDS
Pre-existing third pillar pension funds have also had an important impact on reform,
particularly in Hungary.  Voluntary third pillar pension funds usually regard the establishment of
a mandatory second pillar as a threat to their business. They may be concerned that second-pillar
contributions will crowd out investments in their funds.  On the other hand,  existing private
pension funds may be convinced to participate in the second pillar.  In this case, they tend to
lobby  for  making the  organization and regulation of  the second  pillar  match  their  current
organizational structure.  They lobby to  establish regulations that provide  their  funds with
different forms of comparative advantage, and limit the number of regulatory bodies they must
deal  with.  In  Hungary, pre-existing third-pillar pension  funds had  a  substantial impact on
reform.  The regulatory body set up for the third pillar reform in  1993 launched a successful
effort to make second pillar funds mirror the organization of the third pillar, and place them
under the regulatory authority of the same third-pillar body.  In Poland, private pension funds
protested  against  the  establishment  of  a  special  regulatory  body  for  second-pillar  funds,
preferring to  extend the  current regulatory regime,  headed by the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission.  However, they were unsuccessful, due to the confrontational tactics they took.
Polish pension fund companies further lobbied against the high level of reserves required in the
law  and  against  the  minimum return  guarantee that  discourages risky  investments.  Fund
management companies were also active in  lobbying for specific marketing regulations that
would enable their marketing strategies.  Pension fund companies tend to be weak at the early
stages of reform, but become stronger during implementation, since they become necessary to
the functioning of the private pillar.  This suggests that governments should use the commitment-
and  coalition-building phases, when financial interests are weaker, to  introduce a  sufficient
regulatory structure that might not be possible later on.
7  CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY  RECOMMENDATIONS
This report presented five hypotheses about the influence of political-institutional factors
on pension reform in three postcommunist countries.  In this conclusion, I will first summarize
the outcomes of reform, then test the validity of the hypotheses against the evidence presented in
the  case  studies,  and  finally  educe  recommendations for  policymakers  seeking to  further
fundamental pension reform in the postcommunist countries.
7.1  REFORM  OUTCOMES
All three countries considered in this report substantially reduced the size of their public
PAYG pension systems, and implemented new funded pillars.  Table 5 summarizes the main
changes enacted in each country.  Kazakhstan clearly had the most fundamental change of the
three cases, entirely phasing out its public PAYG system over time.  By contrast, Poland and
Hungary both  maintained relatively large public PAYG components, although both countries
made dramatic changes.  Hungary introduced tighter eligibility requirements, Swiss indexation,
and a substantial increase in the retirement age, while Poland made a transition to a notional
defined contribution scheme, that will record individual contributions in special notional capital
accounts.  Kazakhstan will also direct a larger share of gross wages,  10 percent, to the new
private pillar, compared to  7.3 percent in  Poland and 6 percent in  Hungary.  Although the
contribution rate to the second pillar is slightly smaller in Hungary, it is approximately the same
60as a percentage of total pension contributions, since Polard also,  has a larger contribution rate to
the overall public system, at 29.7 percent versus 24 percent in  Hungary. Poland also enacted a
substantial reform of  the third pillar,  which had  been completed earlier in  Hungary.  The
following sections explore the reasons behind some of the observed differences in the three
reforms, in light of the five hypotheses developed in sections 2 and 3 of this report.
TABLE  5.  FUNDAMENTAL  PENSION  REFORMS  IN KAZAKHSTAN,  HUNGARY,  AND  POLAND
Size of contr-ibutionis  to  Alajor  chianges  in  lt  iisk  of  IMIajor  changes in
first and seconid  pillars  first lillar  E  T  pilar  third  pill
Kazakhstan  15%  to public  PAYG  Gradual  elimination  of  Staite  Accumulation  Fund
system  gradually  PAYG  system;  is  the dominant  player  in
decreased  to zero;  Replacement  with  the second  pillar,  offers
10%  to second  pillar.  minimum  pension  state  guarantees  and safer
guarantee;  inv,stments;
Continuation  of phased  Private  pension  funds
increase  in  retirement  age  have  15%  of market.
to 63/58  in 2002.
Hungary  24% to first  pillar;  Tighter  eligibility;  Private  pension  funds
6% to second  pillar.  Swiss  indexation;  organized  aLs  mutual
benefit socileties;
Retirement age to
increase  from 60/55  to 62  Regulated  by same
for both  men  and women  agerncy  as third  pillar
_________  by 2008.  funds.
Poland  12.22%  to first  pillar;  NDC  first pillar;  Private  pension  New regulatory  structure
7.3%  to second  pillar;  Retirement  ages  cornpanies;  for  third  pillar allows  for
%to s  d pmn  gmend  at  f  Supervision  by new  savings  through  life 17.48% to disability and  ucagda656fo  Spevsnbyew  insurance and inter-
other benefits.  men/women;  Penision  Fund  etrrs  eso  ud
Benefit  based  on actuarial  Supervisory  Board.  eith erpployee
formula.  representation.
Sources: Cangiano  et al. (1998);  Muller  (1999).
7.2  POLICY LEGACIES
The first hypothesis, derived from Weir and Skocpol's model of the social policy process,
states that policy legacies influence present reform choices.  In the case of pension reform,
countries with high implicit pension debt were expected to choose to retain a larger public pillar
and a smaller private pillar.  This study confirms the findings of James (1998b, 460), showing a
correlation between high implicit pension debt and size of the new public pillar.  Kazakhstan had
the lowest implicit pension debt of the three countries examined here, and had the most radical
reform, with the most drastic reduction in the size of the public,  pillar, and the largest proportion
of contributions channeled to the new private pillar, 10 percent of gross wages.  Hungary and
Ploland  retained large public PAYG pillars, and implemented  smaller private pillars.
While confirming these results, this paper has advanced understanding of the mechanism
by which they occur.  Perceptions of affordability are important, as reformers in Hungary and
Poland did not push for a steeper reduction in the public P'AYG  system and a larger private pillar
in part because they did not think it could be financed.  'But  in part, larger PAYG systems were
protected in Hungary and Poland by more powerful advocates within the reforming governments
and partisan veto actors.  This suggests that larger PAYG systems have deeper political support,
making them more difficult to reduce, regardless of financing issues.
61Policy legacies also influenced other features of reform.  For instance, the design of pre-
existing private pension funds had a major impact on the design of the second pillar, suggesting a
strong path dependency.  In Hungary, third pillar voluntary private funds were established in
1993, before the launch of fundamental reform.  These funds lobbied successfully to render the
organization of the new second pillar similar to their own, and to use the same regulatory body.
Part  of  their  effectiveness came  from  their  closeness to  the  main  partisan  veto  actor,  the
Hungarian Socialist Party, many of whose officials were involved in the third pillar.
While  policy legacies were important in  certain respects, in  many other ways, these
fundamental reforms wiped out key features of the previous pension  system, in particular the
special pension privileges that were prevalent under communism, and that should have been the
most difficult to alter, according to prevalent theories (Pierson 1994).  This monumental change
took place in all three countries, and went directly against the interests of certain concentrated
interest groups, including miners, railway workers, judges,  military officers and pilots.  This
indicates that policy legacies and the resilience of welfare state institutions are systematically
weaker in the postcommunist states than in advanced industrial countries.
7.3  VETO  AND  PROPOSAL  ACTORS
Building on the work of Tsebelis (1995) and Immergut (1992), I hypothesized that the
extent of change in the new pension systems would depend on the number of veto and proposal
actors involved in reform, and the policy distance between them.  This hypothesis has  been
substantiated  by the case studies above.
Kazakhstan had the smallest number of veto actors, and the most radical reform, while
Hungary and Poland had comparably large numbers of veto actors, and reforms that included a
moderate reduction in the public PAYG system, and the introduction of private, funded pillars of
approximately one-quarter to one-third of total contributions.  Furthermore, based on the record
of parliamentary debates, there is every reason to think th.at  if the Kazakh parliament had been a
true veto actor, then Kazakhstan would have had a more moderate reform.  The number of veto
actors appears to have a major impact on the degree of reform.
What about proposal actors?  I have introduced the concept of proposal actors in this
report, because it would have been impossible to  analyze the process of pension reform by
looking at veto actors alone.  Veto actors in these three cases often did not have fixed policy
positions and relied on others to propose reform ideas.  Similarly, some proposal actors, whose
ideas were the source of much debate and innovation, were not veto actors. The evidence shows
that combined veto and proposal actors had the greatest influence on reform, for instance in the
case of the special offices for pension reform that were important in every case.  Support of veto
actors, such as the President of Poland, was obviously important, but did not do much to shape
the specifics of reform.  What was the impact of proposal actors that were not veto actors, such
as the Solidarity trade union in Poland or the Pension Insurance Fund (PIF) supervisory board in
Hungary?  The evidence shows that these non-veto proposal actors  also  had  an  important
influence on  reform.  Proposal actors set  the  terms of  debate  in  a  country,  and  provide
ammunition and expertise for sympathetic groups. In the case of Hungary, the PIF proposal was
important because it lent credibility to trade union reservations, strengthening their bargaining
position.  Similarly in Poland, the fact that the Solidarity proposal also called for a partially-
privatized  pillar  was  vital,  because  it  allowed  a  general  agreement  to  emerge  between
government and opposition that facilitated passage of the new system in parliament.  Proposal
actors with comprehensive and expert reform ideas can have a major impact on reform, whether
or not they are veto actors.
627.4  INTEREST  GROUPS
Civil society groups without a well-elaborated reform proposal, that  instead pursue a
partial, and often self-interested, agenda with regards to refornm  can also have an impact.  This
impact was hypothesized to depend on their relations to and distance from important veto actors,
and their ability to mobilize constituencies to  exert pressure at critical veto points.  Evidence
from the case studies also supports this hypothesis.  For instEmce,  in Kazakhstan, pensioners'
associations mobilized  extensively to  oppose reforn,  but  had  little  effect  because  of  their
marginalization from power.  The lack of a parliamentary veto considerably weakened their
ability to influence the political process.  In contrast in Poland.,  when Solidarity miners' unions
rrLobilized  to put pressure on the government to agree to special early retirement arrangements,
they were successful mainly because of their strong ties to the then ruling party.  In Hungary,
where few civil society groups mobilized extensively against reform, interest groups that did
have a substantial impact were ones closely allied with the main partisan veto actor, the Socialist
Party.  Similarly in Kazakhstan, the only interest group to gain special treatment in the new
system,  employees  of  the  military  and  internal affairs agen,cies were  powerful  within  the
government.
7,5  WORLD  BANK  INTERVENTIONS
World Bank interventions and ideas have proven to be influential in reforming countries,
as hypothesized.  Direct interventions in Poland and Htmgary were critical to the design and
completion of reformn.  And while the World Bank did not intervene in Kazakhstan until after the
design phase, it did provide a $300m loan that helped the reform to go forward.  What is striking
is the variation in the type of outcomes that are possible with WVorld  Bank assistance.  All three
cases show that the World Bank generally encourages reformn  programs that include a substantial
private, funded pillar, in which the funds are privately rnanaged, but the shape and size of this
pillar  may vary  radically,  depending on the  advice  given by  individual World Bank  staff
nmembers  and consultants, and local conditions.
The case studies underscore the importance of ideas in shaping the reform process in each
of the three countries. Kazakh reformers began to design a partially-funded system, in part, after
reading Averting the Old Age Crisis and participating in World Bank conferences on pension
reform. This suggests that World Bank influence can be exerted indirectly, through contributions
to global social policy discourse.  Evidence from Poland confirms this result.  The introduction
of a notional defined contribution first pillar in Poland reflected the influence of specific World
EBank  advisers and their particular ideas and experiences. In Hungary the technical and modeling
expertise of World Bank  staff and consultants was critical in  analyzing the consequences of
different policy options and therefore in providing reformers with ammunition that they could
use to overcome opposition. World Bank influence through ideas and direct interventions is thus
fDund  to be powerful, but also more variable than expected.  Of course, it is also plausible that
tie  ideas were listened to more carefully because the World Bark had money to back them up.
1.6  TRADEOFFS  ACROSS DELIBERATIVE  FORA
A  fifth  hypothesis  concerned tradeoffs  across deliberative  fora.  It  suggested  that
negotiation in  one  forum can sometimes substitute for deliberation in another,  and because
different fora tend to privilege different actors, that reformers should think strategically about
which  deliberative  fora  to  focus  on.  In  some  cases,  the  evidence seems  to  indicate  the
availability of such tradeoffs. For instance in Hungary, deliberation in the Interest Reconciliation
Council appears to  have lessened the pressure for extenlsive  deliberation in parliament, where
63some of  the  same  interests were  represented, notably the  leftist  trade  unions.  In  Poland,
reformers employed the  usual practice of extensive deliberation in parliament,  lessening the
impact of other deliberative bodies at the final stages of reform.  In Kazakhstan, no deliberative
body was particularly important, since its tripartite council had little impact on reform outcomes,
and its parliament was not given a veto role.  Opposition to  reform was mainly voiced in the
press and a series of public meetings organized by the government for informational purposes.
Therefore, the  case studies provide some  evidence, but not  overwhelming evidence, of the
potential for tradeoffs across deliberative fora.  Some fora, like parliament, are unavoidable and
necessary to  any legislative process.  Similarly, tripartite negotiation in interest reconciliation
councils  is  often  mandated  in  postcommunist  countries.  However,  reformers  also  have
significant choices about which fora to focus on, and these have an impact on which actors have
the most influence over the final shape of reform.
7.7  TRADEOFFS  ACROSS  REFORM  PHASES
The sixth hypothesis posited tradeoffs across phases of reform.  Involving only a small
number of veto and proposal actors in the commitment-building  stage may lead to a more radical
basic design, but may also force greater compromises at the coalition-building stage, when new
veto  and proposal  actors finally must  be  consulted.  Excluding potential veto  actors at the
coalition-building stage may  speed reforn,  but cause backtracking in  implementation, when
these actors take powsver  or mobilize against reform. However, involving all key actors at an early
stage may water down reform and prevent the implementation of a sizeable private pillar.  No
simple solutions exist, but  the three  case studies above do verify the existence of  tradeoffs
between the three stages of reform.
Kazakhstan produced the most radical and rapid reform by narrowing down the number
of veto and proposal actors through a special legislative process that tied the hands of parliament,
effectively eliminating its veto power, and by conducting the planning of reform in secret, thus
reducing chances for alternative veto and proposal actors to voice their concerns. However these
methods  of  exclusion helped  to  delegitimize the  reform, contributing to  spontaneous  mass
noncompliance in the first months of implementation, and to 85% of citizens initially choosing
the State Accumulation Fund over private pension funds.  An exclusive policy process  also
caused anti-reform mobilization during implementation that threatened to renew some special
privileges.  By contrast in Hungary, the policy process included only those interest groups close
to the ruling coalition, while excluding others.  This  coalition-only process  facilitated quick
passage  of  reform  legislation,  but  also  contributed  to  a  serious  reversal  in  the  early
implementation stage, when an opposition party came to power and scaled back the new private
pillar.  Poland meanwhile had the longest commitment-building  and coalition-building processes,
painstakingly fighting every battle and negotiating reform with all relevant parties.  This slowed
the  reform  process,  but  eventually  enabled  the  implementation of  a  reform  that  has  the
confidence of all major veto and proposal actors, and therefore seems less likely to suffer from
anti-reform mobilization or significant design reversals in implementation.
7.8  POLICY  RECOMMENDATIONS
How can the World Bank better pursue its social policy agenda in a political environment
characterized by  multiple  veto and proposal  actors?  Can  it  do more to  offset  legacies of
communist-era social policies?  Can it better manage tradeoffs across stages of reform?  This
section derives policy  recommendations from findings related to  each of the six hypotheses
presented above.
647.8.1  POLICY LEGACIES
The World Bank already does a great deal to help countries deal with the legacy of past
pension systems, mainly by loaning them money to finance the transition to a funded system.
F'or instance, the World Bank granted Kazakhstan a $300 million loan to finance its transition.  It
is not clear that the World Bank can do more to lessen the burdLen  of policy legacies reflected in
implicit  pension  debt.  The availability of  World Bank  financing sends a  strong signal to
policymakers, encouraging them to consider fundamental change, including a mandatory, funded
pillar.  With  financial  assistance available, the main  challenge for  the  World  Bank  is  to
adequately tailor its advice to local conditions and convince policy actors of the desirability of
fundamental reform.
7.8.2  VETO AND PROPOSAL ACTORS
The World Bank is most likely to achieve its reform objectives when it dominates advice
to the sole proposal actor in a pension reform process. However, in the initial stages of reform in
rmost  countries, the World Bank often finds itself in competition with multiple veto and proposal
actors.  In such a context, the World Bank needs to convince the top institutional veto actors,
including the prime minister and president, to support proposal.s  for fundamental reform, and to
eliminate alternative proposals from  consideration.  In  every case examined here, this  was
achieved through the establishment of a single governmental special office or working group for
pension reform, dedicated to fundarnental change.  Establishment of such a special office often
signals governmental commitment to fundamental reform and resolves internal conflict over
basic reform design.
In the early stages of reform, the World Bank's main ob  jective should be to establish such
a  special office with  a clear government mandate for fundamental reform.  If no  alternative
proposal actors exist, a special office should be set up at the veiy start of the policy process, with
broad participation from key veto actors, as in Kazakhstan.  However, if alternative proposal
a  ctors are already mobilized and oppose fundamental reform, the World Bank may initially have
to  operate through  other channels, without full governmental commitment to  reform.  The
Hungarian case is instructive in this regard.  Lacking support from the whole government, the
'World Bank in Hungary initially funded a Finance Ministry working group on pension reform,
that battled Ministry of Welfare resistance to a private, funded pillar.  Once the Hungarian prime
minister committed to fundamental reform, an interministerial working group could be formed,
with representatives from both ministries.
The World Bank should give careful consideration to the structure of special offices for
pension reform.  A special office is often conceived as a technical unit charged with designing
the reform program.  However, its role may go well beyond this.  First, it may play an important
role  as  a  deliberative forum  for  reconciling differences among alternative proposal  actors.
Second, the special office can play an important coordinating role in the implementation phase,
helping to  integrate new actors into the pension reform process, and troubleshooting reform
r egulations and procedures.
As a deliberative mechanism, the special office can operate in different ways.  A special
office can be exclusive and secretive, as in Kazakhstan, prodLucing  more radical reform at the
e  xpense of low public awareness and support for change. On the other hand, a special office can
alLso  provide a mechanism for generating inclusive deliberation.  For instance, special offices or
working groups in  Poland  and Hungary exhibited important elements of  inclusiveness.  In
DHungary,  the  inter-ministerial working  group on pension reform included  experts from  the
Ministry of Welfare, who had previously opposed reform, as well as a representative of the
65Hungarian financial community.  Poland's  special office included non-governmental experts,
who had a major impact on the shape of reform, and helped to insure opposition political support
for the proposal in parliament.  While inclusiveness inevitably forces compromises, both cases
show the potential political benefits of using a special office to include a wide variety of experts
from different agencies and interest groups in the design of reform.  Inclusion of multiple veto
and  proposal  actors  in  deliberation tends  to  minimize  opposition  to  reform,  both  within
government and parliament.
Inclusion of non-governmental experts may be  possible only  if the  special office for
pension reform gains significant organizational independence from the government.  Poland's
special office was set up with such a political strategy in mind. The Office of the Plenipotentiary
was established as an independent group of technical experts working under the direction of a
head of office.  A Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform, separate from the head of office,
acted as a political operative, conducting negotiations within the government and parliament and
performing other political tasks relevant to reforn, but not day-to-day technical operations. This
model may prove useful for other states embarking on reform.  Autonomy for a special office
allows it to cooperate with partisan and interest group actors both within and outside of the
governing coalition, and across all the different government agencies.
Using a special office as a deliberative mechanism may be more advantageous than using
pre-existing public consultative bodies.  Special offices could include a special advisory board,
with  wide  representative  functions,  that  would  allow  reformers  a  direct  channel  of
communication with key actors in the reform process, in a  forum that privileges the agenda-
setting power  of the  special office.  A  special office can also  organize conferences, special
meetings,  and  exchanges  of  letters  within  the  context  of  a  well-defined public  relations
campaign.
In addition to providing a deliberative forum, special offices can also coordinate reform
activities in the early implementation phase, and help to incorporate new actors into the pension
reform process.  Poland's  Office of the Plenipotentiary played an important role in facilitating
the establishment of the new pension fund regulatory agency, UNFE, and drafting additional
laws  and  regulations.  The  political  challenges of  reform  deliberation  do  not  end  with
implementation.  New  actors  are created in  implementation, new  interests  spring  up,  and
unforeseen regulatory challenges arise.  Therefore a special office should be conceived as more
than  a  design shop  for the  early stages  of reform.  It has  an  important role  to  play as  a
clearinghouse and  deliberative forum for coordination among actors involved in the reform,
including new ones created by implementation itself.  Its life should continue through the first
two years of implementation.
7.8.3  INTEREST  GROUPS
The impact of interest groups depends on their relations to key veto and proposal actors,
and on their capacity for anti-reform mobilization.  Interest groups that  elaborate their  own
proposals for reforn  should be consulted in the early planning stages, and, if possible, included
in  the  composition of  special  offices for pension reform.  Early  inclusion  will reduce the
likelihood of opposition at a  later stage, although possibly at the cost of changes in reform
design.  Section six presented numerous examples of concessions granted to interest groups in
the reform process in Kazakhstan, Hungary, and Poland, showing that a wide variety of interest
groups have been convinced to support fundarnental  reform.  Some require selective incentives,
while others agree with fundamental reform out of ideological conviction. New trade unions, for
instance,  generally  support  market  reform  and  should be  seen  as  potential  allies  in  any
fundamental reform effort.  When concessions are necessary to avoid anti-reform mobilization,
66the World Bank should recommend concessions that satisfy interest groups'  short tenn goals,
while minimizing long-term effects on reform.  A good exarnple of this  are the  short-term
increases in pension rates agreed to in Hungary in exchange for the adoption of half-price, half-
wage indexation over the long term.  Providing ways for interest groups to participate in second-
or third-pillar pension reform business has also proven effective in Hungary and Poland.
7.3.4  WORLD  BANK INTERVENTIONS
A comparison of World Bank interventions in Kazakhstan, Hungary and Poland showed
the surprising impact of specific reform ideas. In Kazakhstan, reformers implemented a program
ol reform that included a mandatory, funded pillar without direct World Bank assistance in the
planning stages.  Reformers had read Averting the Old Age C'risis and attended World Bank
conferences,  and,  together  with  advice  from  USAID,  became  convinced  of  these  ideas.
Similarly, Poland implemented a notional defined contribution first pillar largely because of the,
personal experience of the World Bank official designated to  be head of  the Office of the
Plenipotentiary for pension reform.  This official's belief iin  a notional defined contribution first
pillar translated directly into policy in  Poland.  These two examples show that  fundamental
reform programs often reflect the specific reform ideas of key actors.  Therefore, it seems that
WYorld  Bank's  role  in  generating reform ideas  can  be  equally  as  important  as  its  direct
interventions.  A key challenge for the future is for the World EBank  to develop more systematic
ways of tailoring multi-pillar reform to specific local conditiorns. Some within the Bank have
recently argued that private, funded systems may not be appropriate for countries with low levels
of governance and regulatory capacity. Further research needs to be done to enhance knowledge
about what types of reform are appropriate for different countries around the world.  This and
other new knowledge generated and disseminated by the Bank may have an independent effect
on reformn  quality, above and beyond its impact on direct policy interventions.
7.8.5  TRADEOFFS  ACROSS DELIBERATIVE  FORA
Case studies show that reformers face tradeoffs across deliberative fora for negotiation
vwith  reform actors.  One implication is that reformers should give careful attention to the fora in
which  fundamental reform is discussed.  Given the close technical cooperation between the
Vlorld Bank and special offices for pension reform, the possibilities of expanding the use of these
special offices as deliberative fora should be explored.  It may be possible in some cases to
incorporate institutional and partisan veto actors and interest groups into discussions within a
special office structure, for instance in an advisory body to the special office, and to use this as a
means  of disseminating  information and  reaching agreement with  a  wide  range  of  actors.
Dleliberation in  this  more  controlled forum  could  senre to  replace the, need  for  extensive
deliberation in other bodies.  We have seen that deliberation in parliament serves to enhance the
power of partisan veto actors and their allied interest groups, and that deliberation in tripartite
councils privileges the interests of trade unions.  Similarly, deliberation within special office
st:ructures  should enhance the ability of reformers  to influence thLe  course of negotiation.
7.8.6  TRADEOFFS  ACROSS  REFORM STAGES
Reformers also  face tradeoffs across stages of reforrm.  Inclusive negotiation  at the
commitment-building  stage  will  require  compromises  in  basic  design,  while  exclusive
negotiation will require more compromises at the coalition-building phase,  and  cause more
resistance in implementation. Reformers need to make conscious decisions about which veto and
proposal actors to include at each stage, while considering the potential costs of excluding any
67proposal actors, interest groups or potential future veto actors, particularly opposition political
parties.  Ideally, fundamental reform would be accepted by as wide a  spectrum of interested
parties as possible.  Pension reform requires spontaneous mass compliance, and therefore any
anti-reform mobilization is potentially dangerous.  On the other hand, new reform ideas are
inherently controversial and it may not be possible to convince alternative proposal actors to
accept the basic premises of fundamental reform. Evidence from the three cases suggests that in
commitment-building, reformers  should  endeavor  to  be  as  inclusive  as  possible,  without
sacrificing the basic objectives of reform. Groups with similar reform ideas should be consulted,
and acceptable compromises reached.  Alternative proposals should be  incorporated, if  at all
possible.  While  negotiations at  the  commitment-building stage may  result  in  substantial
concessions, smooth implementation of reform is a necessary objective.  Major reversals in the
implementation phase can destabilize the system and undermine public confidence.  This can
have a direct impact on reform efficiency. The costs of compromise at the commitment-building
stage  need  to  be  weighed  off  against  the  benefits  of  spontaneous  mass  compliance  in
implementation.  In a major institutional change such as fundamental pension reform, reformers
who are cognizant of these tradeoffs will be prepared to manage a more efficient reform process.
688  APPENDIX  TABLES
8.1  MAJOR  CHANGES  ACROSS  STAGES  OF PENSION  REFORM PROCESS IN KAZAKHSTAN
Commitment-building  Coalition-building  Implementation
First pillar  To be phased out  Unchanged  Unchanged
Contribution rate  Initial 10% contribution to be phased out  Initial contribution rate increased to  Unchanged
over a ten-year period  15%; Phase-out period extended until
death of last participant in state
PAYG system
Pension age  Increased to 65 for both men and women  Increases stop in 2001 when age  Unchanged
reaches 63 (men); 58 (women)
Special benefits  Special benefits eliminated  Lower retirement age for employees  Protests by miners, pilots, and
of "power ministries"; residents of  steelworkers to reinstate special
top two nuclear radiation zones; and  privileges; possible legislative
rural women with more than five  initiatives
children
Eligibility work period  30 years  25 (men); 20 (women) years  Unchanged
Indexation  No automatic indexation  Regular price indexation  Unchanged
Minimum pension  Means-tested minimum state pension  Unchanged  Unchanged
financed by central government budget;
no automatic indexation
Switching  Mandatory for new labor force entrants  Unchanged  Unchanged
Disability pensions  Substantial reform  Unchanged  Unchanged
Second pillar
Contribution rate  10% (employee)  Unchanlgeu  Unchanrged
Guarantees  No guarantees in private pillar  Guarantees for contributions to State
Accumulation Fund, but not private
funds
Annuity payments8.2  MAJOR  CHANGES ACROSS STAGES OF PENSION  REFORM  PROCESS  IN HUNGARY
Commitment-building  Coalition-building  Implementation
First pillar
Contribution rate  Long-term target rate increased from 15% to  22% for those in new system;  24% for those in new system; 30% for
18% (employer); to be phased in over time  30% for those in old; employee  those in old
contributions capped at 2x average wage;
employer contributions not capped
Pension age  62 for both men and women  Transition period agreed  Unchanged
Special benefits  Paid for by higher contributions in agreed  Paid for by higher contributions; system
occupations starting 1998  to be phased in by 2000
Eligibility  work period  35 years  20 years; more generous counting for
university students, mothers
Indexation  From wage to Swiss indexation  Swiss indexation delayed until 2001;  Swiss indexation implemented earlier
generous a priori increases
Minimum pension  From no minimum pension to a means-tested  Minor changes in calculation of mmiimum
minimum state pension financed by central  benefit
and local government budgets
Switching  Mandatory switching for those 47 and under  Voluntary switch for current workers
Disability pensions  Substantial reform  Reform delayed
Second pillar
Contribution rate  10% (employee)  6-8% phased in over two years  6% (employee)
Guarantees  Guarantee fund  State stands behind guarantee fund; will
also guarantee annuities
Annuity payments  Unisex tables for calculating benefits8.3  MAJOR CHANGES ACROSS STAGES OF PENSION REFORM PROCESS IN POLAND
Commitment-building  Coalition-building: Phase i  Coalition-building: Phase 2  Implementation
First pillar  Transition to Notional .etimed  Unchanged  Unchanged
Contribution (NDC) system
Contribution rate  Undefined  36% of gross wages or 25% of  Unchanged  Unchanged
net wages; capped at 250% of
average wage
Pension age  65 for both men and women  62 for both men and women  65 (men); 60 (women)  Unchanged
with incentives to retire later
Special benefits  Elimination of most special  Elimination of most special  Bridging pensions arranged for  Specific categories of workers
benefits  benefits; inclusion of military  certain categories of workers  and bridging arrangements
and railway workers; farmers'  and those with acquired rights;  negotiated
system unreformed  judges excluded
Eligibility work period  15-35 years  25 years  25 (men); 20 (women) (.)  Unchanged
Indexation  Price or wage indexation  Average living costs  Mixed price-wage formula  Unchanged
with 20% share of wages
Minimum pension  Minimum pension of 20-30%  Minimum pension estimated at  Unchanged
of average wage; indexed  28% of average wage;
minimum work period req.
Switching  Undefined  Optional switching for those  Unchanged  Unchanged
aged 30-50
Disability pensions  Unreformed  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged
Second pillar
Contribution rate  Undefined  9% of gross wages or 6% of  Unchanged  Unchanged
net wages
Guarantees  Undefined  Guarantee fund for bankruptcy;  Unchanged  Unchanged
guaranteed relative minimum
rate of return in private pillar
Annuity payments  Unisex tables for calculating
benefits
Third pillar  Undefined  New regulations for voluntary  Unchanged  Unchanged
pension funds; New multiple-
employer plans
For further description of the new Polish pension system, see Agnieszka Chlon, Marek Gora and Michal Rutkowski (1999), "Shaping Pension Reform in Poland:
Security Through Diversity," World Bank Pension Reform Primer, Appendix tables 7 and 8, pp. 61-63.WORKS CITED
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